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Ethiopian Constitutional Law: The
Structure of the Ethiopian Government
and the New Constitution's Ability to
Overcome Ethiopia's Problems
T. S. TWIBELL*

t

Woe to the nation in which each tribe claims to be a nation.
-Kahlil Gibran
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1994, Ethiopia enacted its new Constitution. After one of
the longest legacies of monarchal rule in Africa, Ethiopia's

* Admitted Kansas and Missouri Bar (Bar No. pending), J.D. University
of
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, 1998; B.S. Public Administration, Southwest
Missouri State University, 1994. The author practices at Kurlbaum, Stoll, Seaman &
Mostoe, P.C., in Kansas City, Missouri, and engages in the practice of international and
business immigration law including matters dealing specifically with Ethiopian law. The
author also works with Iraqi and Somalian refugees at the Don Bosco Center in Kansas
City, Missouri, as well as volunteering as an attorney for Don Bosco's immigration
matters. The author was Lead Literary Editor of the UMKC Law Review; Abstract
Editor of the Urban Lawyer Journal, Editorial Assistant of the American Bar
Association's Appellate Practice Journal, and a member of the UMKC Willem C. Vis
Moot Arbitration Team which competed in Vienna, Austria in 1998 with issues governed
under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
He was a member in the UMKC Inmate Legal Assistance Program and a Supplemental
Education Instructor at the UMKC School of Law for Torts I and Constitutional Law 1.
He has authored International Law for Domestic Consumption for the Australian LAW

SOCIETY JOURNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES.
He also
international law throughout the United States in
PERSPECTIVES of the Northwestern School of Law of Lewis
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW and

has authored articles on
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

& Clark College, the ILSA
the UMKC LAW REVIEW.

He was listed in Who's Who in American Law Students in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
t The author would like to dedicate this Article to Rima A. Wahab of the Capacity
21 Project, the United Nations Development Program in Lebanon, who contributed to the
concept of this Article and who dedicates herself to the mission of a thriving Africa and
who was inspired by her father, Dr. Ali Wahab's interest and scholarly contributions to
Africa.

399

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 21:399

monarchy and recent dictatorship are no more. 1 Ethiopia is now a
democracy. The new Ethiopian Constitution provides extensive
protection for democracy, individual rights and freedoms. Or does
it? Some scholars believe the rights and freedoms that are so
extensively addressed in the Ethiopian Constitution 2 are not
adequately protected because of structural flaws.
Ethiopia needs a sound constitution that adequately protects
democracy and individual rights. The twentieth century has
brought
political turmoil, war, starvation, 3 and stagnated
economic development in Ethiopia. Further, its north-eastern
4
lands have ceded to become the new African nation of Eritrea.
Ethiopia's new Constitution ambitiously seeks to remedy the ills
that have plagued most African nations long after the colonial
influence 5 has been removed. 6 With Ethiopia's new government
in 1991, and its 1994 Constitution, perhaps Ethiopia is on the brink

1. Monarchal rule in Ethiopia ended in 1974 when the Marxist dictatorship, led by
Mengistu Haile Mariam, came into power. His rule ended in May, 1991, when Mengistu
fled to Zimbabwe in exile. See ETHIOPIA: A COUNTRY STUDY xxvi-vii (Thomas P.
Ofcansky & LaVerle Berry eds., 1993). For a discussion of Haile Sellassie, who was
Ethiopia's monarch for much of the twentieth century, see CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM,
HAILE-SELLASIE'S GOVERNMENT (1969).

2. For a textual discussion solely devoted to the Ethiopian Constitution, see FASIL
NAHUM, CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OF NATIONS:

THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECT

(1997).
3. See, e.g., Janice J. Bole, Feast or Famine: Do Ethiopians Have a Choice?, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 3 (1986).
4. For a discussion on the secession of Eritrea and the Eritrean Revolution, see DAN
CONNELL, AGAINST ALL ODDS: A CHRONICLE OF THE ERITREAN REVOLUTION WITH
A NEW AFTERWARD ON THE POSTWAR TRANSITION (1997); TEKESTE NAGASH,
ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA: THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (1997).
5. For a discussion on other new African states struggling after the end of
colonialism, such as Kenya, Somalia and Zambia, see YILMA MAKONNEN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA (1983). See Dr. Makau Wa
Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1113 (1995).
6. France, which along with England, was one of the two primary colonial forces that
shaped Africa, and has recently criticized the United States for its failed role in African
politics, just as France's role failed decades ago. See Ben Barber, Francefinds policy
vindicated in Central Africa Calls U.S. goals naive as 2 nations vie for hegemony, THE
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3458603. For a more in depth
discussion of American failures in Africa, see Kenneth Roth, American Failuresin Africa,
TIKKUN, July 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11213814. For a criticism of the United
States' role in Africa and particularly with Ethiopia, see Don Melvin, Carter Says U.S.
Lacks Strategy to Help Africa, THE ATLANTA J.,June 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL
3697268. See also JEFFREY HERBST, U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD AFRICA (1993).
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of a new era, serving as an example for other African
nations,
7
which now appear to be headed for major conflict.
This Article examines Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution to
determine whether it truly instills the constitutional and legal
structure necessary to overcome the obstacles that have befallen
Ethiopia. While this Article will be comprehensive, it will focus on
the goals included in the Constitutional Preamble. While it is
unlikely that a critical look at Ethiopia's constitution will lead to
amendment, it is necessary, in order to maximize Ethiopia's ability
to become a successful thriving African nation, to understand
where the strengths and weaknesses lie.
First, this Article provides a brief overview of the significance
of Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a magnificent nation and perhaps the
world's most ancient. Its history is rich and it has affected the
religious, political and anthropological history of everyone on
Earth.
8
Second, the legal and governmental structures of Ethiopia
are provided because they are necessary for any discussion on a
new, emerging democracy. This is especially true because the
workings of Ethiopia's legal structure are unknown to most.
Third, as its main thesis, this Article will analyze the
constitutional law of Ethiopia. The discussion will revolve around
whether the extensive democratic rights and individual liberties
delineated in the Constitution can be protected under the designed
governmental and legal structure. Aside from the Constitution
itself, this Article includes commentary on the Ethiopian
Constitutional structure. The Article utilizes the U.S. Department
of State Report on the Ethiopian government, as well as news
reports, as actual evidence of whether the constitutional structure
exists in Ethiopia. While a few articles have been written on the
subject, these articles were written only a year after the
Constitution was ratified. The Constitution has now been in effect
for almost five years, and a new analysis is needed. For example,
some scholars improperly analyzed the Constitution's use of
7. Ethiopia has been striving to overcome the problems of past regimes, particularly
the dictatorial government of Mengistu that left in 1991, and the government is taking the
unprecedented step of prosecuting the previous regime as well as striving for democracy.
8. See 1 & 2 CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF ETHIOPIA (Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I
University eds., 1972) (discussing the legal structure of Ethiopia during the reign of the
Imperial Majesty Haile Sellassie I).
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"ethnicity" as the demarcation of its federal system. Their fears of
an "ethnic federation" have not come to light. This Article will
demonstrate that, considering Ethiopia's history and the current
African political environment, the use of "ethnicity" was the only
viable alternative.
It is true, as stated by Kahlil Gibran, the famous Lebanese
philosopher, author and poet, that "one should give woe to the
nation in which each tribe stands as a nation instead of unifying
into one nation." This is noted by most scholars condemning
Ethiopia's federal-state structure because it is based on an ethnic
delineation. It is necessary, however, after hundreds of years of
domination by the Amhara, that the various tribes now have a
chance to be afforded autonomy and recognition by their
Constitution. With this autonomy and recognition in the newly
forming democracy, the various groups in Ethiopia will begin to
form a new common culture that will unify Ethiopia. Ethiopia,
despite its ethnic diversity, has always remained united, and only
by recognizing this diversity within the Constitution will the tribes
be alleviated of the desire to form their own nations. Ethiopia can
then stabilize and develop its economic, industrial, agricultural,
and educational infrastructure. Once that is accomplished, human
rights, individual liberties, and democracy will flourish.
II. ETHIOPIA: A CORNERSTONE FOR AFRICA AND ALL OF
HUMANKIND

With the possible exceptions of nations such as Saudi Arabia
and the Vatican, in no other country in the world is there more
oneness between a leader and the people than in Ethiopia.
Crown and Church in the person of His Imperial 9Majesty are
also inextricably interwoven in this ancient Empire.
Ethiopia has something for everyone. 10 It has affected
humanity on all major levels. Anthropological studies have found
some of the earliest roots of homosapiens in Ethiopia. Ethiopia
may in fact be the home of every human; "Lucy," the famous
human ancestor, crucial in the chain of human evolution, was

9. KENNETH R. REDDEN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ETHIOPIA 1 (1968).
10. For books solely discussing Ethiopia's history and culture, see STEVEN GISH,
ETHIOPIA (1996); ETHIOPIA IN PICTURES (Lerner et al. eds., 1988); DENNIS BRINDELL
FRADIN, ETHIOPIA (1994); RICHARD & BARBARA PANKURST, THE ETHIOPIANS (1998).
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discovered in Ethiopia. 11 Ethiopia is also the only African nation
to briefly halt colonialism.
Ethiopia has a history of over three thousand years and is
mentioned in the Old Testament. 12 Under Menelik, the Ethiopian
Ruler in the late nineteenth Century, 13 Ethiopia was able to
achieve its sovereignty and independence with the AngloEthiopian settlement of 1897.14 It is the only country to win a
major battle against the European powers. 15 Some have stated
that "[t]his unprecedented defeat of a modern European army by
an African power is still considered one of the greatest battles ever
16
fought in Africa."
Like many African countries, Ethiopia has a rich and varied
mix of ethnic groups and religion. 17 The three primary Abrahamic
religions are represented by significant portions of the
population. 18 Although the chief language is Amharic, a language
11. See DONALD C. JOHANSON, ET AL., LUCY: THE BEGINNINGS OF HUMANKIND
(1990); NICOLE VERRECHIA, ET AL., LUCY AND HER TIMES (1997).
12. See PETER SCHWAB, HAILE SELASSIE 1,ETHIOPIA'S LION OF JUDAH 10 (1979).
13. See HAROLD G. MARCUS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MENELIK II: ETHIOPIA
1844-1913 (1995).
14. See HAROLD G. MARCUS, A HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA 103 (1994).
15. Italy suffered a great loss against the Menelik 1I's army assuming that "much of
the Ethiopian army was either too ill to fight or was away from camp foraging for food and
fodder." Id. at 98. Ethiopia encountered Italy once again in World War II. See ANGELO
DEL BOCA, THE ETHIOPIAN WAR 1935-1941 (1965). After World War II, Ethiopia was
practically a British Protectorate. For this discussion and many others, see JOHN H.
SPENCER, ETHIOPIA AT BAY: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE HAILE SELLASSIE YEARS
(1984).
16. L. Mendola, In the Shadow of the Lion, The Imperial Family of Ethiopia, The
Imperial
House
of
Ethiopia
1(visited
Sept.
24,
1998)
<http://www.regalis.com/ethiopia.html>. [Menelik II] owed his international fame and
respect to his army's successful defense against an invading Italian force at Adwa on
March 1, 1896. It was this event, more than any other, that prompted the European
powers to take the African nation seriously. This unprecedented defeat of a modern
European army by an African power is still considered one of the greatest battles ever
fought in Africa. "All told, the Italian army lost 70 percent of its forces, an incredible
disaster for a modern army." MARCUS, supra note 14, at 99.
17. For information on Ethiopia in general, including historical, political and
demographic data, see the following materials on the Internet: Ethiopia the Beautiful
(visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wube.net/history.html>; Ethiopia (visited Nov. 1, 1998);
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/et.html>; Ethiopia: Political Environment
(visited
Nov.
1,
1998)
<http:www.tradecompass.com/library/books/com-guide?ETHIOPIA03.html>;
Government
of
Ethiopia
(Nov.
1,
1998)
<http:www.emulateme.com/government/ethiopgov.htm>.
18. Islam, Christianity and Judaism are all represented in Ethiopia.
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of Semitic or Arabic origin, 19 there are more than "70 languages
and over 200 dialects are currently spoken in Ethiopia." 20 Three
major groups and their languages dominate:
the "Semitic
(Amharic, Tigrinya), Cushitic (Oromo, Sidama, Somali), and
Omotic (e.g., Welayta, Kefa). ' '2 ' Out of the three, the dominant
cultural identity is Amharic, 22 the ruling class of Ethiopia who
migrated from what is today the southern portion of Saudi
23
Arabia.
While the Oromo are greater in number (about forty percent
of the population as opposed to the Amhara with thirty percent),
the Amhara comprise the dominant culture. 24 The Arabs, or the
Semites, who originally developed in Ethiopia, migrated to areas
of what is today considered the Middle East, and then back to
25
Ethiopia in the seventh century B.C.
An estimated one-third to one-half of the population are Christian, the vast
majority of whom are member of the Ethiopian Orthodox (Coptic) Church;
another estimated 35 percent are Muslim; and about 25,000 are Falashas (an
early Jewish sect). The remainder follow a variety of animist cults which
frequently blend into Coptic or Islamic practice in areas where more than one
religious practice exists.
REDDEN, supra note 9, at 19 (These numbers will of course vary because of the date of
this book).
19. See AYELE BEKERIE, ETHIOPIC, AN AFRICAN WRITING SYSTEM: ITS HISTORY
AND PRINCIPLES (1997) (discussing the Amharic language).
20. Id. at 16.
21. MULATU WUBNEH & YOHANNIS ABATE, ETHIOPIA:
TRANSITION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 126 (1988).
22. See CLAPHAM, supra note 1, at 4 (Haile-Sellassie's government was basically an
Amharic one.); see also WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 21, at 131:
In spite of [the Amhara's] small numbers (they are not a majority group), the
Amhara have dominated the Ethiopian political scene for several hundred years.
The Amhara leadership of the twentieth century, which was primarily from
Shewa, used Amharic and Christianity as integrating factors to forge a nation
with a multi-ethnic society. This process of Amharaization has aroused some
resentment among some Oromo and Tigray.
Id.
23. See RICHARD PANKHURST, THE ETHIOPIAN BORDERLANDS:
ESSAYS IN
REGIONAL HISTORY FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE END OF THE 1 8 1h CENTURY 280

(1997) (The migration of the Oromo, the second or third largest ethnic group in Ethiopia,
from the southern portion of Ethiopia into the core of the region was a turning point in
Ethiopian history).
24. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 21, at 128.
25.

See HAGGAI ERLICH, ETHIOPIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (1994).

"Waves of

immigrants from the southern parts of the Arab Peninsula imported their Semitic culture
and languages, beginning in the seventh century B.C., settling on the African coast of the
Red Sea and on the Ethiopian Plateau."

1999]

Ethiopian ConstitutionalLaw

405

Ethiopia once ruled much of Southern Arabia until the
Persian navy arrived on the Southern Arabian coast around 570
B.C., "perhaps even on the day Muhammad was born," and ended
Ethiopian authority in the region. 26 Thus, instead of the Arabs
moving into Ethiopia and taking rule, it may be that they were
27
merely returning home.
Although the Amhara were Arab in origin, 28 they were
Christian. Ethiopia is the home of Coptic Christianity, which has
now spread into Egypt, and Ethiopia is now considered a "corebased Christian state." 29 Ethiopia's form of Christianity is unique
because of its isolation from other Christian states, and can best be
described as being akin to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. 30 When
the Prophet Muhammad began to preach the new religion of
31
Islam, some of his first converts were Ethiopians.
Although a minority in relation to Islam and Christianity,
Judaism also has a rich history in Ethiopia. Israel launched a
massive, unprecedented campaign that ended in i985, to move all
Ethiopian Jews from refugee camps to Israel. 32

26.

MARCUS, supra note 14, at 10.

27. See id. at 3.
Evidence is strong that the Afro-Asiatic (Hamitic-Semitic) group of languages
developed and fissured in the Sudan-Ethiopian borderlands. There ProtoCushitic and Proto-Semitic began their evolution. In Ethiopia, the Semiticbranch grew into a northern group, today echoed in Tigrinya, and a southern
group, best heard in Amharic. It simultaneously spread to the Middle East,
whence, millennia later, it returned in a written form to enrich its cousins several
times removed.
Id.
28. See SCHWAB, supra note 12, at 10.
Once known as Abyssinia (the term is said to derive from the Habahat, A South
Arabian tribe that settled in East Africa), Ethiopia is mentioned by both Homer
and Herodotus and is also referred to in the Old Testament. The Semitic settlers
of original Ethiopia arrived from Arabis in the first half of the first millennium
B.C., mixed with local Cushites ....
Id.
29.

PANKHURST, supra note 23, at 433.

30. See WUBNEH & ABATE, supra note 21, at 126.
31. See ERLICH, supra note 25, at 9-10. According to some Muslim texts, the King of
Ethiopia converted to Islam from Christianity and "[s]ome of Muhammad's close
associates and important figures in Mecca during the times of the four caliphs were sons of
Ethiopian women." Id
3Z See Arthur M. Aaron, Recent Developments, Humanitarian Intervention,
Nationality and the Rights of Refugees- Operation Moses: The IsraeliAirlift of Ethiopian
Jews, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 585 (1985).
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Ethiopia's northern lands were once heralded by the ancient
Egyptians in Pharaonic times as "God's land." 33 Ethiopia is said
to be the last resting place for the Ark of the Covenant. 34 Ethiopia
also has one of the longest histories of monarchal rule. The
famous Queen of Sheba was Ethiopian. She and King Solomon
parented Menelik I, who then became King of Ethiopia. 35 "The
contemporary rulers of Ethiopia were descended from the Kings
of Shewa who, according to the longstanding tradition, descended
from Menelik... through the "Solomonic" line that ruled most of
Ethiopia from 1268 until 1854."36
Thus, all through history, Ethiopia has been the center stage
of human development in many pivotal ways. It also has remained
unique compared to the rest of Africa. Perhaps as Ethiopia,
armed with a Constitution promoting values of human dignity and
freedom of cultural identity, strives to overcome the starvation and
dictatorial rule of the past century, it may reemerge in a form as
rich as its history.
III.

THE ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTION

As with all constitutions, the Ethiopian Constitution was
drafted to address the ills of the previous regime and the political
turmoil that preceded it. 37 The new Constitution then becomes a
sort of solution or recipe to remedy past mistakes, and to put the
nation on the path of a chosen policy. 38 The language of the
33. PANKHURST, supra note 23, at 3. For an account of Ethiopian Jews in Israel, see
TESHOME G. WAGAW, FOR OUR SOUL:
ETHIOPIAN JEWS IN ISRAEL (1993);
DURRENDA ONOLEMHEMHEN, ET AL., THE BLACK JEWS OF ISRAEL:
THE LAST
EXODUS (1998).
34. See, e.g., GRAHAM HANCOCK, THE SIGN AND THE SEAL: THE QUEST FOR THE
LOST ARK OF THE COVENANT (1993).
35. See REDDEN, supra note 9, at 2.

36. Mendola, supra note 16, at 1; see also MARCUS, supra note 14, at 17. "Article 2 of
the revised Ethiopian Constitution of 1955 claimed that the ruling line descended from
Menilek I,the son of Makeda, queen of Ethiopia, and King Solomon." Id.
37. The preamble of a nation's constitution brings to light some of the concerns of the
drafters. For example, in Zambia, the Preamble include specific workers' rights:
"Recognizing the right to work to free choice of employment, to just and favorable
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment." ZAMBIA CONST. preamble

6.
38. An extreme but excellent example of a constitution in its forefront bringing up as
its perceived "past ills," is the Constitution of Iran. The Iranian Constitution is a very
complex document that provides detailed discussion of the ideology behind it. For
example, after the Preamble, there is a section titled, "The Dawn of the Movement,"
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Ethiopian Constitution makes its goals and remedies very clear,
especially considering Ethiopian political history and the strife it
39
has experienced during this century.
In its brief existence, the Constitution has drawn only a
modest amount of scholarly attention. 40 Much of this work was
written at almost the exact moment the Constitution was ratified,
calculating the time for publication and editing. 41 Of course, most
of the authors were attempting to evaluate the Constitution and
determine whether it would accomplish its ratifiers' goals. 42
The Constitution's Preamble specifically sets forth Ethiopia's
goals. 43 Each clause evidences Ethiopia's past and its desired
which begins by stating:
The devastating protest of Imam Khumayni against the American conspiracy
known as the 'White Revolution,' which was a step intended to stabilize the
foundations of despotic rule and to reinforce the political, cultural, and
economic dependence of Iran on world imperialism, brought into being a united
movement of the people and immediately afterwards, a momentous revolution
of the Muslim nation in June 1993.
IRAN CONST., The Dawn of the Movement. For a discussion on the Iranian perspective of
the United States and the Middle East, see T.S. Twibell, Implementation of the United
Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods (CISG) Under Shari'a
(Islamic Law): Will Article 76 of the CISG be Enforced when the Forum is in an Islamic
State?, INT'L LEGAL PERSP. (forthcoming).
39. For a more detailed discussion on the role of Ethiopia's history with its current
legal system, see John W. Van Doren, Positivism and the Rule of Law, Formal Systems or
Concealed Values: A Case Study of the Ethiopian Legal System, 3 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 165 (1994).
40. See Jon Abbink, Ethnicity and Constitutionalismin Contemporary Ethiopia,41 J.
AFR. L. 159 (1997); Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact Upon
Unity, Human Rights and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1 (1996);
James C. N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional
Orders: The Case for Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235 (1994); and Ugo Mattei,
The New Ethiopian Constitution: First Thoughts on Ethnical Federalism and the Reception
of Western Institutions (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.gelso.unitn.it/cardadm/review/Constitutional/Mattei2.html>.
41. See generally id.
42. See id.
43. ETH. CONST. preamble:
We, the nations, nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia:
Determined to build by the exercise of our right to self-determination, for
ourselves and of our own free will, a single political community which is based
on our common consent and the rule of law so as to ensure lasting peace, an
irreversible and thriving democracy and an accelerated economic and social
development for our country Ethiopia;
Strongly convinced of the necessity of respect for the fundamental rights of
individuals and of the nations and nationalitiesas well as the even development of
the various cultures and religionsfor the attainment of these objectives;
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future. These goals should first trickle down from the 105 specific
articles of the Constitution into Ethiopia's statutory law,
administrative regulations, codes and case law, and finally to the
state and local governments. While no one disagrees with the
goals of the Preamble, 44 commentators debate whether the cause
of Ethiopia's problem is the Constitution or some other
component of Ethiopian 45law, such as the codes, statutes, and
administrative regulations.
The Preamble is not the most comprehensive list of Ethiopia's
goals. It does, however, protect human rights and freedoms,
promote economic development, equal treatment for all ethnic
groups, and democracy. The question of Ethiopia's "true" goals is
debatable, but it is enough to evaluate the Constitution to
determine whether its execution furthers the goals listed therein.
Before delving into a discussion of the Constitution it is
necessary to provide an overview of the structure of the Ethiopian
State. Most people, including lawyers, know very little about this
exotic African nation let alone its legal structure. With the legal
structure, as designed by the Constitution, in mind, the
constitutional discussion can more easily be grasped. Further, an
overview provides an excellent picture of the Ethiopian
government for its own sake.

Convinced that we, the nations,nationalitiesand people, with our own individual
and admirable culture, territoriesand modes of life have, by virtue of the fact that
our country Ethiopia has been and still is our common home in which we have
formed a common bond of relationships in variousfields and in varying degrees,
developed a common interest and outlook;
Recognizing thatour common destiny needs to be based upon the rectificationof
historicallydistortedrelationshipsand promotingcommon interests;
Convinced of the necessity of building a single economic community so as to
promote our common rights, freedoms and interests;
Determined to ensure the maintenance of the peace and democracy we have
achieved through our struggle and sacrifice;
Now, therefore, in order to consolidate these aims and beliefs, do hereby adopt
this Constitution through our representatives in the Constitutional Assembly on
this December 9 of 1994.
44. The goals of the Preamble are goals that certainly any nation would concede as
desirable, or certainly, not undesirable.
45. See generally supra note 39.
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IV. THE STRUCrURE OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE

A. The Federal Government
46
Ethiopia is a democracy organized as a federal system.
Accordingly, it is called the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia. 47 The Ethiopian territory is determined by border state
compromises and international agreements. 48 The Constitution is
the supreme and primary source of law from which all subordinate
law stems. 49 Hence, "law, customary practices, and decisions
made by state organs or public officials inconsistent" with the
Constitution are "null and void." 50 All "citizens, state organs,
political organizations, other associations and their officials" must
uphold the Constitution. 51
As with the United States
Constitution, 52 international agreements or treaties are regarded
as the supreme law of Ethiopia in equal regard to the Constitution
53
itself.
This initial statement of constitutional structure is located at
the forefront of Ethiopia's detailed Constitution.
The
54
governmental structure does not begin until almost the middle.
The first half of the Ethiopian Constitution addresses human
rights, civil rights and various other similar protections against the
government. 55 The rights extend equally to women, a current
trend in African law. 56 This adds to the significance and
importance of the Constitution's fundamental rights and freedoms.
The second half of the Constitution deals with governmental
structure. The two primary organs of the federal system are the
states and the Federal Government. 57
Both organs have

46. See ETH. CONST.art. 1.
47. See id.
48. See id. art. 2.
49. See id. art. 9, § 1.
50. Id.
51. Id. art. 9, § 2.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
53. See ETH. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
54. See id. art. 45 et seq.
55. See ETH. CONST. ch. 3, "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms."
56. See Eugene Cotran, The Changing Nature of African Nature, FAMILY LAW IN
ASIA AND AFRICA 16 (J.N.D. Anderson ed., 1967).
57. See ETH. CONST. art. 50, § 1.
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legislative, executive and judicial powers. 58 The "states" 59 are
structured on the "basis of settlement patterns, language, identity
and consent of the people." 60 Essentially, because of centuries of
Amharic dominance, the Constitution recognizes ethnic groupings
to the extent that the states are actually defined by the major
ethnic groups. 61 Each state is then named, 62 and the large
Southern People's State is defined in more detail. 63 Each State has
equal powers and rights64 as well as the power to secede and
become an independent nation. 65 This fact concerns many legal
scholars, who fear the division of the federation on ethnic
parameters. 66 If there is a border dispute between the States, it
must be settled between the states involved. 67 If this cannot be
accomplished, the Council of the Federation 68 will make the
decision based on "settlement patterns and interests of the
people." 69 These Constitutional provisions evidence the effort to
give each ethnic group a sense of identity and power in the new
government. This is unlike some constitutions that force ethnic
Some
groups together in the name of nationalism. 70

5& See id. § 2.
59. See id. art. 46, § 1.
60. Id. § 2.
61. For.a full discussion on Ethnic groups and their history in Ethiopia, see DONALD
H. LEVINE, GREATER ETHIOPIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY
(1977).
62. See ETH. CONST. art. 47, § 1 (listing the following states: Tirgrai State, Afar State,
Amara State, Oromia State, Somali State, Benshangul/Gumaz State, Southern People's
State, Gambela Peoples' State and Harari Peoples' State).
63. See id. The Nations, Nationalities and peoples of the Southern Peoples' State are
the following: Hadiya Hamer, Melon Mursi Minit Male Surma Sidama Shekock Sheko
Busa Besketo Burji Bencho Bodi Nao Gnangatamo Alaba Kembata Keficho Kore
(Amaro) Konso Konta Arboro Aide Ori Wolaita Zeise Zelman Yem Dime Disenech
Dawro Dizi Gaweda Gurage Gidicha Gidole Gamo Gedeo Gobeze Gofa Tenbara Chara
Tsemay. Id.
64. See id. § 3.
65. See id. § 2.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 327-362.
67. See ETH. CONST. art. 48, § 1.
6& See infra text accompanying notes 74-116.
69. ETH. CONST. art. 48, § 1.
70. Although the Soviet Constitution provided for both the cessation of its republics
and based the republics on ethnic guidelines not unlike the Ethiopian Constitution, its
federalism "was a sham. The heads ... of Moscow in effect ruled all jurisdictions as a de
facto unitary republic." Haile, supra note 40, at 17, citing JORGEN S. RASMUSSEN & JOEL
C. MOSES, MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 489 (9th ed. 1955).
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commentators assert that this is a crucial weakness in the
Ethiopian Constitution. 71 As discussed later, however, this may
72
instead be a strength.
Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia and is an
independent entity, 73 as Washington, D.C. is in the United States.
Oromia, the state in which Addis Ababa lies, states that its
interests should not be compromised by the presence of Addis
Ababa and its autonomous qualities. 74 The people of Addis
Ababa are represented by the Council of People's
75
Representatives.
1. The Legislative Branch
All powers of the Federal Government are dictated by the
Constitution, and it may delegate any of its powers under Article
5176 to the state governments. 77 The Parliament of the Federal
Government is composed of two chambers; the Council of
78
People's Representatives and the Council of the Federation.
The "supreme" power of the Federal Government is instilled in
79
the Council of People's Representatives.
The number of members on the Council of People's
Representatives is based on the population in each electoral
district.
Minorities and others are endowed with special
representation. 80 Members represent the people as a whole and
are responsible to the Constitution, the People, and "their
conscience." 81 Members are also granted special protections from
prosecution, 82 some of which are designed to protect the members'

71. See Haile, supra note 40, at 20.
"[F]ragmentation is envisaged, indeed
encouraged, by providing for minorities within each of the 'states' to establish their own
additional 'states."' Id.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 339-362.
73. See ETH. CONsT. art. 49, § 1.
74. See id. § 4.
75. See id. § 5.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85, 105.
77. See ETH. CONST. art. 50, § 9. The States may delegate some of their powers to
the Federal government as well. See id. See also infra text accompanying notes 155-81.
78. See ETH. CONST. art. 53.
79. See id. art. 50, § 3.
80. See id. art. 54, § 6.
81. Id. § 3.
82. See id. 54, § 5. "No member of the Council may be arrested or prosecuted without
the permission of the Council except when caught in flagrante delicto for a serious
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freedom of speech. 83 Elections take place "every five years in a
direct, free and fair election by universal suffrage which shall be
held by secret ballot." 84 If, at any time, the people lose confidence
in a member, legal structures may be implemented to remove that
85
member.
While both the Council of People's Representatives and
Council of the Federation have certain powers and duties to
implement, 86 the Council of People's Representatives also has its
87
own specific grant of powers and duties.

offence." Id.
83. See id. § 4. "No action or charge may be brought or an administrative measure be
taken against any member of the Council for a vote cast or statement made in the
Council." Id.
84. Id.§1.
85. See id. § 7.
86. The powers of the Federal Government under Article 51 of the Ethiopian
Constitution include the following: (1) Preparation and implementation of "general
economic, social development policies, strategies and plans of the country;" (2)
preparation and implementation of "fiscal and monetary as well as foreign investment
policies and strategies;" (3) preparation and implementation of national standards and
policies in the areas of "health, education, culture, historical, heritage and science and
technology;" (4) the determination and implementation of foreign policy including the
participation and ratification of international agreements; (5) organization and guidance
of public safety, national defense and governance of Federal government police force; (6)
the direction and control of inter-state commerce and foreign trade; (7) determination and
control of immigration, passports, visas, refugees and political asylum; (8) granting
nationality; (9) the levying and administration of taxes and duties on Federal Government
revenue as well as the approval and administration the Federal Government's budget; (10)
the promotion, administration and control of "air, rail and sea transport; postal;
telecommunication services as well as highways linking more than two states;" (11) the
administration of the National Bank, issuance of currency, loans, foreign exchange,
currency circulation and regulation of states borrowing from local sources; (12) regulation
of intellectual property; (14) the declaration and lifting of state emergencies in Ethiopia as
a whole or entirety; (15) deploying Federal armed forces when a State requests such or in
instances where the situation is beyond the State's control; (16) regulation of land, natural
resources and historical issues; (17) regulation of rivers and lakes linking two or more
states; (18) regulating political organizations and elections necessary for implementing
Constitutional rights; (19) safeguarding and defending the Constitution; (20) regulation of
"the carrying of arms"; and (21) the administration and promotion of service institutions
created and funded by the budget of the federal government. See id. art. 51.
87. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions under sub-Article (1) of this
Article (limiting the following powers to those powers specifically falling within the
powers of the Federal Government), the Council of Peoples' Representatives shall enact
laws with respect to the following matters:
a) Nationality, immigration, passport, entry and exit visas, refugee and matters
relating to political asylum.
b) Utilization of land, natural resources, rivers and lakes crossing the border of
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Additionally, the Constitution provides as follows:

the country or linking two or more states.
c) Inter-state commerce and foreign trade.
d) Air, rail, sea transport, postal and telecommunication services and highways
linking two or more states.
e) Artistic and intellectual property rights.
f) Uniform time and measurement standards.
g) Election and exercise of political rights in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution.
h) Carrying of arms.
3. Enact labour laws.
4. Enact commercial laws/codes.
5. Enact a Penal Code. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the States shall have
the power to enact penal laws on matters not covered by the Penal Code of the
Federal Government.
6. Enact laws on areas of private law where the interest of creating a single
economic community requires that such laws be enacted on a federal level.
7. Decide upon the organization of public defense and police force of the
Federal Government.
8. Declare state of emergency in accordance with the provisions of Article 95 of
this Constitution. Approve the declaration of state of emergency made by the
executive branch.
9. Declare war based on draft laws submitted to it by the Council of Ministers.
10. Approve general economic, social development policies and strategies, fiscal
and monetary policies of the country, enacts laws on currency, administration of
the National Bank, foreign exchange and circulation of money.
11. Levy taxes and duties on the sources of revenue reserved for the Federal
Government. Approve the budget of the Federal Government.
12. Ratify international agreements signed by the executive branch.
13. Approve appointment of judges of the Federal Courts, members of the
Council of Ministers, General Auditor, and other officials whose appointment
shall be approved by the Council.
14. Establish a Human Rights Commission and determine its powers and duties.
15. Establish an Ombudsman, elect and appoint members that shall lead it;
determine its powers and duties.
16. Request, on its own initiative and without the consent of the State
concerned, a joint meeting of the Council of Peoples' Representatives and the
Council of the Federation for the adoption of appropriate measures where
human rights are violated in a state and the state persists in its violation, and
give directives to the state for the implementation of the decisions that are
adopted.
17. The Council shall have the power to call the Prime Minister and Ministers
for questioning and inspect the activities of the executive branch.
18. Deliberate on any item within the powers of the executive where one third
of the members of the Council so request. The Council shall have the power to
deliberate and take any measure it deems appropriate.
19. Elect the Speaker of the Council and the deputy speaker of the Council;
establish committees necessary to carry out its activities.
Id. art. 55, § 2.
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89
specifics of voting 88 and adopting laws within the Council;
political parties; 90 the convening of the council; 91 elections; 92 terms
of members; 93 procedural rules; 94 and the ability of the public to
view the proceedings of the council. 95 Rules of procedure 96 and
the voting required to render a decision 97 are also addressed.
outlines procedures related to dissolution
Finally, the Constitution
98
of the Council.
The Council of the Federation, despite the Council of
People's Representatives "supreme" power, 99 actually wields
much of the ultimate power. The Council of Federation has the
power of Constitutional interpretation, 100 including establishing
the Constitutional Court. 10 1 It can also order the Federal
Government to intervene in state disputes, 10 2 seek solutions to
state disagreements, 10 3 decide issues on the secession of states, 1°4

88. See id. art. 58, § 1. "A simple majority of the members of the Council shall
constitute a quorum." Id.
89. See id. art. 57. "Laws upon which the Council has deliberated and agreed shall be
submitted to the President for signature. The President shall affix his signature within 15
days. The law shall come into force where the president fails to affix his signature within
15 days." Id..
90. See id. art. 56. "A Political party or a coalition of political parties obtaining the
highest number of seats in the Council shall have the power to form and lead the executive
branch of the Federal Government." Id.
91. See id. art. 58, § 2. "The Council shall convene on the Monday of the last week of
Meskerem and shall continue to the 30th day of Sene. It shall have a one month recess at
a time to be determined by the Council." Id.
92. See id. § 3. "Members of the Council of Peoples' Representatives shall be elected
for a term of five years. New elections shall be held one month before the expiry of the
term." Id.
93. See id.
94. See id. § 4. "The House speaker of the Council may call a meeting when the
Council is on recess. The House speaker shall have an obligation to call a meeting where a
majority of the members of the Council so request." Id.
95. See id. § 5. "No meeting of the Council shall be closed to public except upon a
request by the members of the Council or the executive branch of the Federal
Government supported by a majority of the members of the Council." Id.
96. See id. art. 59, § 2.
97. See id. §l.
9& See id. art. 60.
99. See id. art. 53.
100. See id. art. 62, § 1.
101. See id § 2.
102. See id. § 8.
103. See id. § 6.
104. See id. § 3.
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allocate federal revenues to states, 10 5 and even order the Federal
Government to intervene when a state violates the Constitution or
"endangers the constitutional order." 10 6 Thus, although the list of
powers afforded the government are more limited 10 7 in
comparison to the Council of People's Representatives,' 0 8 the
powers of the Council of the Federation are very broad. Some
commentators claim that such power is a detriment to the proper
functioning of a federal state because it is potentially more
powerful than the People's Council. 10 9 There are some procedural
differences, such as Quorum requirements (two thirds instead of
simple majority), 110 and its budget must be approved by the
People's Council. 111 Protection of Federal Council members
regarding speech, voting, 112 and other charges, 113 is similar to that
of the People's Council. 114 Federal Council members must vote in
105. See id. § 7.
106. Id. art. 67, § 8.
107. The powers and responsibilities of the Council of the Federation are as follows:
1. The power of interpretation of the Constitution shall be vested in the Council
of the Federation.
2. The Council shall establish the Constitutional Court.
3. The Council shall decide upon questions arising with respect to the right of
self determination up to secession of nations, nationalities and peoples, in
accordance with the provisions of the constitution.
4. It shall promote and develop the equality of peoples and the unity,
established by their free choice, provided for in this constitution.
5. It shall perform the functions assigned to it jointly with the Council of
Peoples' Representatives.
6. It shall seek solutions to disagreements arising between states.
7. It shall decide on the sharing of revenues that are common to the Federal and
State governments and determine the grounds for allocating federal funds to the
respective states.
8. It shall order the Federal Government to intervene where any state, by
violating the provision of this Constitution, endangers the constitutional order.
9. It shall establish permanent and provisional committees of the Council.
10. It shall elect its house speaker and deputy house speaker and adopt its own
rules of procedure.
Id art. 62.
108. See id. art. 55.
109. "Although the FC [Federal Council] does not primarily function as a legislative
chamber, the constitution makes it a repository of the most potent and decisive
powers .... Haile, supra note 40, at 26.
110. See ETH. CONST. art. 64.
111. See id. art. 65.
112. See id. art. 63, § 2.
113. Seeid.§1.
114. See id. art. 54, §§ 4-5.
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person and they may not simultaneously serve on the People's
Council. 115 The Federal Council consists of representatives from
the "nations, nationalities and peoples of the member States of the
Federation," 116 and each group has at least one representative.
Every additional million people requires one additional
representative." 7 These representatives may be elected by either
118
the State parliaments or a general direct election by the people.
2. The President of the Republic
The President is the figure head of Ethiopia, or Head of State,
rather than the figure head of the individual legislative, judicial or
executive branches. Nomination of the President is made by the
People's Council. 119 He must then be elected by a two-thirds
majority vote of a joint meeting of the People's Council and the
Federal Council. 120 His term lasts for six years and he can serve
no more than two terms.121 The President must also swear an oath
of loyalty to the Constitution before2 2 a joint meeting of the two
councils of the Federal Government.
The President's powers and duties lie in those traditional
roles of a national leader or Head of State. The President appoints
ambassadors and other envoys that are first nominated by the
The President meets foreign
Ethiopian Prime Minister.' 23
representatives and other envoys. 124 He awards military awards,
convenes the annual joint sessions of the federal councils, grants
amnesty, awards prizes and medals and promulgates treaties and
international agreements which are ratified by the People's
Council. 125 The primary executive authority resides in the Prime
Minister and Council of Ministers in the executive branch who
126
share joint responsibility for their official joint decisions.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See id. art. 68.
Id. art. 61, § 1.
See id. § 2.
See id. § 3.
See id. art. 70, § 1.
See id. § 2.
See id. § 4.
See id. § 5.
See id. art. 71, § 1.
See id. § 2.
See id. §§ 3-7.
See id. art. 72.

19991

EthiopianConstitutionalLaw

3. The Executive Branch
The Prime Minister has the same term of office as the
People's Council. 127 He is elected from among the People's
Council by the political party, or group of political parties, who
have obtained a majority of seats in the People's Council. 128 This
political party, or parties, then assumes the power of
government. 129 The powers and duties of the Prime Minister are
executive in nature; enforcing and implementing those laws
already made by the People's council; nominating government
officials; issuing state of the government reports; presenting
awards and medals to be awarded (to the President); supervising
the overall government and, of course, performing duties assigned
to him by the Constitution and other laws while safeguarding and
abiding by the Constitution. 130 The Constitution provides for a

127. See id. § 3.
128. See id. art. 73, § 1.
129. See id. §.2.
130. The powers and duties of the Prime Minister are the following:
1. The Prime Minister shall be the head of government, chairman of the Council
of Ministers and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
2. The Prime Minister shall nominate the members of the Council of Ministers
from among the two chambers of parliament or other persons found to be
appropriate to the post and present them for approval to the Council of
Representatives.
3. Supervise and ensure the implementation of laws, policies, directives and
decisions issued by the Council of Peoples' Representatives.
4. Direct, coordinate and represent the Council of Ministers.
5. Supervise the implementation of policies, regulations, directives and decisions
of the Council of Ministers.
6. Ensure, in a supervisory capacity, the implementation of the country's foreign
policy.
7. Nominate Commissioners, the President and Vice President of the Federal
Supreme Court, the Auditor General and present them to the Council of
Peoples' Representatives for approval.
8. Supervise the activities of the government and take the necessary corrective
measures.
9. Appoint all high government officials other than those enumerated under
Sub-Articles (2) and (7) of this Article.
10. Present to the President for the award of medals and prizes in accordance
with laws issued by the Council of Peoples' Representatives.
11. Submit periodic reports to the Council of Peoples' Representatives on the
state of the country, the activities of the government and its future plans.
12. Perform other duties assigned to him by this Constitution and other laws.
13. Safeguard and abide by this Constitution.
Id art. 74.
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131
Deputy Prime Minister to assist the Prime Minister in his duties.
The Council of Ministers primarily carries out the more
specific duties of the enforcement, administration and
implementation of duties delineated in the powers and duties of
the People's Council. This includes "law and order" with an
executive, rather than a legislative-type power. 132 The Council is
composed of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and other
members as law determines. 133 The Council is accountable to the
Prime Minister 134 and135the decisions it adopts are accountable to
the People's Council.

4. The Judicial Branch
136
The judicial branch is intended as an independent judiciary.

131. See id. art. 75.
132. Note the powers of the Council of Ministers:
1. Ensure the implementation of laws enacted and decisions made by the
Council of Peoples' Representatives, and issue directives.
2. Organize, direct and coordinate Ministries and other administrative organs
directly accountable to it.
3. Prepare the annual budget of the Federal Government, submit it to the
Council of Peoples' Representatives and ensure its implementation upon
approval.
4. Ensure the implementation of fiscal and monetary policies, administer the
National Bank, issue currencies, borrow money both locally and internationally
and control foreign exchange and circulation of money.
5. Protect artistic and intellectual property rights.
6. Prepare and implement economic and social policies, and strategies.
7. Adopt uniform time and measurement standards.
8. Issue and implement the country's foreign relations policy.
9. Ensure respect for law and order.
10. Decide on the form of organizations of ministries and subordinate organs
accountable to the Council of Ministers.
11. Declare state of emergency, submit the declaration of a state of emergency
to the Council of Peoples' Representatives for its approval within the time
determined by this Constitution.
12. Submit draft laws on all matters, including matters relating to war, to the
Council of Peoples' Representatives.
13.
Perform other duties assigned to it by the Council of Peoples'
Representatives and the Prime Minister.
14. Issue regulations in accordance with the powers given to it by the Council of
Peoples' Representatives.
Id. art. 77.
133. See id. art. 76, § 1.
134. See id. § 2.
135. See id. § 3.
136. See id. art. 78, § 1.
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The Constitution mandates that judges, at all levels, be free from
137
the influence of any other sources, particularly state organs;
only the law may guide judicial authority. 138 Nor are there
extraordinary regulations for relinquishment of a judicial position
are not extraordinary. 139 The Supreme Court has a President and
Vice-President who must be nominated by the Prime Minister and
140
appointed by the People's Council.
141
Judicial power is present at both the federal and state level.
The highest judicial power of the Federal Government resides in
the Federal Supreme Court. 142 There may be courts of original
jurisdiction ("First Instance courts") and courts of appellate
jurisdiction ("Federal High courts"), but they must first be
established by the People's Council. 143 Otherwise, the state courts
retain this judicial authority. 144 Religious and customary courts
may be established by the People's Council. 145 This recognition is
a blessing for the majority of Ethiopians, which the current judicial
system cannot accommodate. Currently, religious and customary
judicial mechanisms, such as Shari'a courts, are helping the
majority of Ethiopians who have little access to the court
146
system.
Unlike the United States, where the Supreme Court is the

137. See id. art. 79, § 2.
138. See id. § 3.
139. See id. § 4.
140. See id. art. 81.
141. See id. art. 79, § 1.
142. See id. art. 78, § 2.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. art. 78, § 5.
146. See U.S. Dep't of State, Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights Practicesfor
1997,
at
5
(visited
Jan.
30,
1998)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1997-hrp.report?ethiopia.html>
[hereinafter 1997 State Dep't Report].
The Constitution provides legal standing to some preexisting religious and
customary courts and gives federal and regional legislatures the authority to
recognize other courts. By law both parties to a dispute must agree before a
case may be heard by a customary or religious court. Shari'a (Islamic) courts
may hear religious and family cases involving Muslims. In addition some
traditional courts still function. Although not sanctioned by law, these courts
resolve disputes for the majority of citizens who live in rural areas and who
generally have little access to formal judicial systems.
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final interpreter of the Constitution, the Ethiopian Constitution
clearly sets forth that Constitutional interpretation is ultimately
The
performed by the Council of the Federation. 147
Constitutional Court, established under Article 82 of the
Constitution, hears the first level of constitutional matters before
submission to the Council of the Federation. This rather complex
mechanism begins with the Constitutional Court, which is
composed of eleven members, consisting of the President and
Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court, three legal
professionals nominated by the People's Council and appointed by
the President of Ethiopia, and six Council of the Federation
148
members.
The Constitutional Court has judicial powers of constitutional
interpretation, but its decisions must be approved by the Federal
Council. 149 The Court serves as a filter for those cases adjudicated
by the federal council; if the constitutionality of a federal or state
law is at issue and is submitted by a "concerned party to the
dispute or court," the Court hears the case and submits its final
decision to the Federal Council. 150 In situations where the
constitutional issue arises in other courts, the Court has the option
of remanding the case if they determine no constitutional issue
exists, or interpreting the case and submitting their decision to the
Federal Council. 151 The President and Vice President of the
Supreme Court, as well as three legal professionals chosen by the
People's Council, sit on the Constitutional Court. With six
members on the Court from the Federal Council in the majority,
the Constitutional Court is more of an administrative screen than a
true check on the power of the Federal Council.
The Ethiopian . judiciary is said to be "weak and
overburdened. ' 152
The U.S. State Department has noted,
however, that the Ethiopian judiciary has continued to show "signs
of independence."' 153 The Report notes that the government has
been acting consistently with the Constitution in seeking to

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See ETH. CONST. art. 83, § 1.
See id. art. 82, § 2.
See id. art. 84, § 1.
Id.
See id. §4.
1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 1.
Id.
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restructure and decentralize the federation, although it "lacks
154
sufficient staff and funds":
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the
Federal and regional courts continued to show signs of judicial
independence. In practice, however, severe shortages of
adequately trained personnel in many regions, as well as serious
financial constraints, combine to keep the judiciary weak and
overburdened and to deny most citizens the full protections
provided for in the Constitution.
Consistent with the Constitution, the Government continued to
restructure and decentralize the judiciary along federal lines
with the establishment of courts at the district and regional
levels. The federal High Court and federal Supreme Court
adjudicate cases involving federal law, trans-regional issues, and
national security and hear both original and appeal cases. The
regional judiciary is increasingly autonomous; district
(Woreda), High and Supreme Courts mirror the structure of the
federal judiciary. The Government delegated some of the war
crimes trials to the supreme courts in the regions where the
crimes were allegedly committed.
The Government continues its sweeping overhaul of the
military justice system. Foreign assistance is being used to train
officers and noncommissioned officers in topics including
judicial and nonjudicial punishment, human rights, and the
conduct of soldiers during military operations.
The Government's goal is a decentralized judicial system that
brings justice closer to the people. 155
B. The State Governments
Just as the supreme power of the Federal Government resides
in the People's Council, the supreme power in the states resides in
the state parliament, which is accountable to the people or
electorate of the state. 156 Organization, as is true of most federal
systems, is at the state and local ("Woreda") level. 157 Although
states may create a more complex system for administrative
154. Id.
155. Id. at 4-5.
156. See ETH. CONST. art. 50, § 3.

157. See id. art. 50, § 4.
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reasons, they must allow for direct popular participation. 158 As
the Federal government has certain powers, 159 so to with the State
Governments. 160
Both levels must respect each other's
autonomy, 161 but may also delegate powers
and duties to the other
162
under Article 51 of the Constitution.
At the state level, the legislature is the state parliament, and is
directed by the Federal Constitution to adopt a state
constitution. 163 The state government has the greatest executive
165
capacity. 164 Judicial powers rest solely in the state courts.
States may also have their own flag 1 66 and determine their own
167
official language.
168
Article 78 establishes judicial power at the state level.
Each state has three levels of judicial power: a State First Instance

158. See id.
159. See id. art. 51.
160. The powers and duties of the state governments are the following:
1. Powers not exclusively reserved to the Federal Government or concurrently
given both to the Federal Government and State Governments by this
Constitution, shall belong to the States.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-Article (1) of this Article, powers
of the State shall include the following:
(a) Prepare and implement economic and social development policies, plans
and strategies.
(b) Enact and implement state constitution and other laws.
(c) Administer land and natural resources in accordance with laws enacted by
the Federal Government.
(d) establish state administration aimed at self-administration; establish a
democratic order where rule of law reigns. Safeguard and defend this
Constitution.
(e) Levy taxes and duties on those sources of revenue reserved for the States;
prepare and implement its own budget;
(f) Enact and implement laws regulating administration and working conditions
of civil servants of the State. It shall however, have the responsibility to ensure
that standards of education, training and experience for a given job category are
comparable to the general standards adopted in the country.
(g) Organize and direct the police force of the state; ensure law and order
within the state.
Id.
161. See id. art. 50, § 8.
162. See id. § 9.
163. See id. § 5.
164. See id. § 6.
165. See id. § 7.
166. Seeid. art. 3,§3.
167. See id. art. 5, § 3.
168. See id. art. 78.
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Court (courts of original jurisdiction); a State High Court (court of
appellate jurisdiction); and a State Supreme Court. 169 The State
Supreme Court has appellate review over State High Court
decisions. 170 As stated above, the states retain original and
appellate jurisdiction unless the Federal Government has
171
specifically designated that area as one of federal jurisdiction.
State and federal areas of jurisdiction overlap. For instance,
the State Supreme Court has the same jurisdiction as the Federal
High Court, 172 and the State High Court has the same jurisdiction
as the Federal Courts of First Instance. 173 Decisions rendered by
any of the aforementioned courts are reviewable by the State
Supreme Court. 174 The Federal Supreme Court may then review
State Supreme Court decisions on areas of federal jurisdiction. 175
There is the question, however, whether the Federal Supreme
Court may review decisions by the State Supreme Court regarding
state matters. To compare, the United States Constitution left the
issue open to statutory regulation 176 and common law. 177 The
Ethiopian Constitution, on the other hand, expressly provides that
the Federal Supreme Court may only review matters of Federal
jurisdiction. States reserve the ultimate power on state issues.
The selection of judges is based on a nomination and
appointment process. Judges in state First Instance Courts are
nominated by their state's Judicial Administration, and are then
appointed by their respective state parliament. 178 State Judicial
Administrators receive the nominations from the Federal Judicial
169. Seeid. §3.
170. See id. art. 80, § 5.
171. Seeid. §2.
172. See id. § 2.
173. See id. § 3.
174. See id.
175. See id. § 6.
176. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, providing that "in all the other cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
177. The United States Supreme Court will hear a case from a state court only if the
state court judgment turned on federal grounds. The Court will refuse jurisdiction if it
finds adequate and independent nonfederal grounds to support the state decision. If it is
unclear whether the state court decision turned on federal or state law, the Supreme Court
may dismiss the case or remand it to the state court for clarification. The Court will
usually assume that there is no adequate state ground unless the state court expressly
states that its decision rests on state law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
178. See ETH. CONST. art. 81, § 5.
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Administration, who render an opinion and submit it to the State
Parliament. 179 Judges for the State Supreme Court and State High
Judicial
Courts are nominated by their respective state 180
Administration and are appointed by the state parliament.
The procedures for state and federal Supreme Court
appointments vary slightly. Each State Supreme Court, like the
Federal Supreme Court, has a President and Vice-President of the
Court who, like other judges, are appointed by their state
parliament. Their nomination, however, rests with their state head
of government. 181 Interestingly, the provision for federal opinion
on the appointment of judges is linked only to the Courts of First
Instance, not the more powerful and influential State High Court
and Supreme Court. Budgets are determined by the respective
state legislatures or parliaments. 182 Judicial discipline for both
state and federal judges is controlled by their respective judicial
183
commissions.
The Constitution's focus is on the rights and freedoms of the
Ethiopian people. The Constitution begins with these precepts.
The issue is whether the structure that follows the exhaustive array
of rights truly and adequately promotes and protects these rights.
The rights themselves may retain flaws because of how they are
articulated, which might severely limit their implementation.
C. The Protectionof Human Rights and IndividualFreedoms
within the Legal and Governmental Structure
The prelude to the Ethiopian Constitution reflects the
document's devotion to democracy and human rights. The
Preamble, 184 the General Provisions, 185 and the Fundamental
Constitutional Principles stress the importance of rights and
In the General
freedoms in the Ethiopian Constitution.
186
Principles,
for example, the Constitution is said to express the

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. § 4.
id. § 3.
id art. 79, § 7.
id. art. 81, § 6.
id. preamble.
id. art. 1.
id. art. 8.

1999]

EthiopianConstitutionalLaw

sovereignty 187 that exists in all of Ethiopia's "nations, nationalities
and peoples .... "188 This sovereignty is to be expressed through
representation and direct participation. 189 Furthermore, all ethnic
groups are provided equal protection under the laws. This is
consistent with the requirement that the national emblem of the
flag must "reflect the equality of nations, nationalities, peoples and
religions in Ethiopia and their aspirations to live in unity." 190 The
national anthem must also "reflect . . . the Ethiopian peoples'
resolve to live in unity within a democratic system and their
common future." 191 Gender is specifically addressed in the
Constitution; Article 7 states that whenever the masculine gender
192
is used, it includes the female gender.
Although the official language is Amharic, "[alll Ethiopian
languages shall enjoy equal state recognition." 193 Commentators
argue that allowing each state to adopt its own official language
undermines the national unity intended in designating Amharic as
the official Ethiopian language. It must be noted that Amharic is
not spoken by even a simple majority of Ethiopians-about sixtyseven percent within urban areas, and only approximately a third
nation-wide. Thus, while its adoption as the official language
encourages unity and facilitates economic transactions, forcing the
states to abandon their own languages would alienate two-thirds of
the population. As the use of Amharic spreads, and Ethiopia
assumes a more modern democratic form with increased
interaction between ethnic groups, it should gradually become the
main language. Amharic is certainly more likely to become the
primary language than any of the various state languages.
The General Principles also contain articles specifically
addressing the protection of Human and Democratic Rights, 194 the
Separation of State and Religion, 195 and the Accountability of
Government. 196 Human rights are deemed to be inherent,
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. art. 8, § 2.
Id. § 1.
See id. § 3.
Id. art. 3, § 2.
Id art. 4.
See id. art. 7.
Id. art. 5, § 2.
See id. art. 10.
See id. art. 11.
See id. art. 12.
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inalienable, and inviolable, and these and other democratic rights
must be protected. 197 Ethiopia is a secular state, 198 and the
General Principles denounce the establishment of a state
religion. 199 There is a strict separation200of church and state, and
any interference by either is prohibited.
Government accountability is a primary goal of the Ethiopian
Constitution. Government activities must "be undertaken in20a1
manner which is open and transparent to the public."
Representatives may be recalled if the public ever loses confidence
in them, 20 2 and all public officials or elected individuals are held
20 3
accountable when they fail to oblige their official capacities.
These constitutional rights are difficult to protect at the local level
20 4
and "local authorities have been unwilling or unable to do so."
In addition, insufficient funding and staff for the judiciary has
made enforcement problematic and "consequently, most citizens
20 5
are denied the full protections provided for in the Constitution."
Compounding this problem, there are specific violations of
the Constitution by the Ethiopian government itself. The reported
206 individual
violations
include
extrajudicial
killings,
2
0
7
2
0
8
disappearances,
mistreatment of prisoners,
arbitrary arrest
and detention, 20 9 lack of fair public trials, 210 government
prosecution of the press,211 lack of search warrants outside of
Addis Ababa,212 violations of women's rights, 213 and occupational

197. See id. art. 10.
198. See id. art. 11, §1.
199. See id. § 2.
200. See § 3.
201. Id. art. 12, § 1.
202. See id. § 2.
203. See id. § 3.
204. 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 1.
205. Id. at 2.
206. See id. at 2-3.
207. See id. at 3.
208. See id. at 3-4.
209. See id. at 3-4.
210. See id. at 4-5.
211. See id. at 6-7. For a brief note on the lack of press freedom in Ethiopia, see Imru
Zelleke, The Sorry State of Press Freedom in Ethiopia,THE WASH. TIMES, July 27, 1998,
at A18. See also Meqdesetarik Mesfin, Freedom of Expressiorn Right or Privilege?,
ETHIOPIAN REVIEW, Mar. 31, 1998, at 35, available in 1998 WL 17182658.
212. See 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 10. "Societal abuse against young
girls continues to be a problem," e.g., female genital mutilation ("FGM") or supposed
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2 14
health standards.

The problems appear to be related to a shortage of resources,
Ethiopia's culture, political history, and lack of education and
training. 215 The 1997 State Report investigating these problems,
however, failed to identify these factors. 216 Instead, the State
Department states that lengthy detentions are often a result of the
"severe shortage and limited training of judges, prosecutors, and
attorneys." 217 The Inspection Department of the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs has difficulty enforcing occupational
health and safety standards because of a "lack of human and
The American Bar Association
financial resources." 2 18
commented on Ethiopia's attempts at democracy and its efforts to
prosecute the previous regime with limited judicial personnel:
Ethiopian leaders may prosecute some of the cases, "if that
happens, the Ethiopian prosecutions could become the most
extensive human rights trials since Nuremberg. They might
even overshadow the similar-and much more widely
publicized -trials being planned for Bosnia-Herzegovina ....
Prosecuting deposed officials is never as easy as it looks ....
Consider that [1] Mengistu's overthrow left the legal system
with only a handful of experienced judges; [.2)] Qualified
defense lawyers are equally hard to come by, largely because
Ethiopia has only one law school (which opened in 1962); and
[3] Prosecutors are sifting evidence involving thousands of
thousands of crimes-all without a
defendants and tens of
219
computerized database.
Ethiopia has made efforts to combat abuses of constitutional
structure and individual protections, and has achieved moderate
success. For example, to prevent prisoner mistreatment, the
government provided additional training for police, 220 and rape

female circumcision which harms both the psychological and physical health of women.
Id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 12-13.
215. See, e.g., id. at 1,4-5, 9-10, 13.
216. See generally id.
217. Id. at 4.
218. Id. at 13.
219. John D. McKinnon, Traveling Human Rights Lawyer, "Todd Howland helps
struggling Ethiopiaprosecute abuses of previous regime," 80 A.B.A. J. 40,40-41 (1994).
220. See 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 3.
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among female prisoners no longer appears to be a problem. 221 To
encourage improvements in prisoner treatment, the government
permits independent monitoring of prisons, including granting
visitation rights to international observers. 222 After223visiting with
the prisoners, there were no reports of mistreatment.
Free speech is also protected. 224 Ethiopians may now discuss
any topic they choose without the threat of government
persecution. Moreover, anti-government groups have "held press
conferences and public meetings without retribution." 225 Many
anti-government newspapers are widely circulated outside of
Addis Ababa, although not many are published outside of the
capital. 226 Academic freedom is also protected, and students may
join in public demonstrations. While some students have been
detained for lack of a permit, 227 these permits are normally
"routinely granted. '228 According to State Department reports,
2 29
all but one demonstration was granted a permit.

Despite some inter-faith conflicts, religious freedom is
generally protected. 230 The State Department has noted, however,
that some Pentecostals have complained of inadequate protection
231
by the government during conflicts with Coptic Christians.
of movement
Other protected freedoms include the freedom
232
within Ethiopia, foreign travel, and emigration.
Non-governmental organizations, such as the Peace and
Development Committee, which has organized and conducted
training workshops for persons from various segments of
Ethiopian society, are helping to improve in the areas of human
rights. 233 These workshops focus on the "history and evolution of

221.
222.
223.
224.
right to
press).
225.
226.
227.
22&
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See idLat 6 (stating that the "Constitution and the 1992 Press Law provide for the
free speech and press"); but see id. at 1 (noting restrictions on freedom of the
Id. at 6.
See id. at 6-7.
See id at 7-8.
Id.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 8.
See id.
See id. at 7.
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human rights, civil and political rights, economic, social and
cultural rights enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution, freedom of
expression, basic women's rights, as well as the concepts and
234
principles of democracy."
Women's rights are protected, and the government includes
them in its planning:
Women's concerns have been factored into the Government's
development planning since 1993. There are women's affairs
desks in each of the ministries. To enhance further the status of
women, the government formally adopted a "National Program
of Action" in June. The program seeks to expand women's
access 23
to5 health care, and educate women concerning maternal
health.
The government seems supportive of the National Committee
on Traditional Practices in Ethiopia, which is dedicated to
eradicating Female Genital Mutilation ("FGM"), and the
government also works to discourage FGM through the public
schools.236 Despite these efforts, however, the overall status of
women in Ethiopia is horrendous. 237 Children, mainly female, are
bought and sold; "[t]he going price for a child is reportedly about
$36."238 There are also major problems with child labor.2 39 The

234. Ethiopia: Seven Days Update, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, June 10, 1998, at 2
(Solomon Demrew, ed.), availablein 1998 WL 13209611.
235. 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 9.
236. See id. at 10.
237. See id. at 10.
Child prostitution is a problem. There were many press reports of the largescale employment of children, especially underage girls, as hotel workers,
barmaids, and sex workers in resort towns and truckstops south of Addis Ababa.
According to the head of the Labor and Social Affairs Office of East Shoa zone,
children are being bought or stolen from the countryside by 'child vendors' and
sold to bar and liquor store owners in Shashemene and Nazareth. The going
price for a child is reportedly about $36. More that 3,000 young girls are
working as dancers, barmaids, and prostitutes in the town of Shashemene.
There are also credible reports that poor rural families sell their young teenage
daughters to hotel and bar owners on the main truck routes. Social workers note
that these girls are prized because their clients believe that they are free of
sexually transmitted diseases. Some families send their unemployed, out-ofschool, underage daughters to work in Middle Eastern countries as house
servants and nannies, some of whom are kept in sexual bondage.
Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 12.
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problem lies mainly in agriculture, the principal sector of the
Ethiopian economy, and one which the government has difficulty
240
regulating.
While democracy seems to be protected, there are those who
choose not to practice it. 241 Some, such as Professor Haile,
condemn the new Constitution and government because a "true"
democratic election did not take place. 242 The groups that did not
participate, however, did so by their own choice. 243 Many groups
do not participate today, not because of government deterrents,
but rather because they choose not to, citing that the current
government was not empowered by a free election. 244 Contrary to
their assertion, "observers organized by foreign donor
governments, the Organization of African Unity, and a coalition of
domestic NGO's judged the elections to be generally free and fair,
245
although they cited numerous irregularities."
Worker rights and collective bargaining are adequately
protected. 246 While there are no accounts of slavery in Ethiopia,
there are some accounts of young people, particularly girls, being
sold by their "families into involuntary servitude in Saudi Arabia
and other Arabian Peninsula states to work as house servants and
nannies, some of whom are kept in sexual bondage." 247 To curb
this phenomenon, the government has indicted many travel agents
and operators who have been linked to these illicit activities that
involve "soliciting potential clients, recruiting young girls,
arranging travel, and fabricating counterfeit work permits, travel
' 24 8
documents, and birth certificates. "
Women,
although
their
participation
remains
disproportionately low, do not seem to be politically restrained by
the Constitution.2 49 In other respects, such as the female children
mentioned above, women are still not adequately protected. This
appears, however, to be rooted more in culture rather than
240.
241.
242
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See id. at 12.
See id. at 8.
See Haile, supra note 40, at 8-9.
See 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 8.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 12.
See id. at 9.
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politics.

2 50

V. DISCUSSION
As with the post-ratification onset of many bodies of law,
most discussion stems from outside observers taking a critical look
at the new legislation. The Ethiopian Constitution certainly has its
detractors. 251 The few scholars who have written on the subject
within the Constitution's short new life have criticized it rather
severely. 252 These scholars tend to have close links to the
country. 253 Most of their criticism, while raising some interesting
points, is fundamentally flawed. Specifically, Professor Haile
criticizes virtually every aspect of the Ethiopian Constitution,
including human rights protections. While Haile would seem to be
qualified to comment on the Constitution soon after it was
ratified, 254 his experience with the
Ethiopian government was
255
under Sellasie's monarchal regime.
Many of the critical articles on the subject

25 6

were written

ratified. 257

barely after the Constitution was
Now that some time
has passed, the supposed fears of the Constitution's critics can be
more clearly seen, and their true causes better correlated.

250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Haile and Mattei, supra note 40.
252. See id.
253. Professor Haile is a professor of law at Cardozo School of Law and was Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia (1971-74), Ambassador of Ethiopia to the United States
(1968-71), Minister of Information and Tourism (1965-68), Chairman of the Emperor's
Cabinent (1962-68), Civil Service Commissioner (1961-62), and Legal Advisor for the
Government of Ethiopia (1961). Ugo Mattei has published many works on African law,
see, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Verso una tripartizione non etnocentrica dei sistemi giuridici; Ugo
Mattei, Socialist and Non Socialist Approaches to Land Law: Continuity and Change in
Somalia and Other African States; Mattei, supra note 40, at 18-19.
254. See Haile, supra note 40, at 3.
255. See id. (noting the deficiencies of a regime under a constitution which did not stand
for democracy and human rights); see also Mattei, supra note 40, at 3-4.
Both the 1931 and the 1955 Haile Selassie's Constitutions were almost 'cynical'
in their realism. The emperor was recognized full political religious and legal
power. Religion as well as force was the source of legitimization of the negus.
This was probably the strongest antidote to political fragmentation in the hands
of the Amhara ruling class.
Id.
256. See Makau Wa Mutuna, The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist
Paradignin Africa, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 591, 1158-59 (1996).
257. See supra note 40.

432

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 21:399

Jon Abbink's analysis of the Constitution is the most accurate
and objective. Abbink maintains that ethnicity must be considered
when analyzing the Constitution. 258 Moreover, other authors, such
as Professor Bereket Selassie, 259 Jerome Wilson, 260 and Derege
Demissie, 261 view Ethiopia's implementation of ethnic federalism
in a much more positive light.
The critics say that the Ethiopian Constitution's content is
excellent in many ways. 262 The criticism mainly revolves around
the issue of ethnicity in the Constitution, and that any reflection of
ethnicity in its provisions creates a shroud of failure. 263 In the
years since the passage of the Constitution, however, despite some
cultural road blocks, the fears of secession and ethnic quarrels
have not been realized. Yet, as these authors have speculated, the
humans rights violations and workings of democracy have
failed.264 The actual causes, however, are not rooted in the
Constitution itself.265 Moreover, a proper evaluation of the history

258. See Jon Abbink, Ethnicity and Constitutionalismin Contemporary Ethiopia,41 J.
AFRICAN L. 159 (1997).
259. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The
Ethiopian-EritreanExperience,29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91,141 (1997).
260. See Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination, 11 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 433,485 (1996).
261. See Derege Demissie, Note, Self-Determination Including Secession vs. The
Territorial Integrity of Nation-States: A Primae Facie Case for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165 (1996).
262. See, e.g., Mattei, supra note 40, at 14-15.
263. See generally infra text accompanying notes 290 and 318.
264. For textual discussion of human rights in Africa, see RONALD COHEN, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA (1994); AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING
WORLD (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, David R. Penna & Debra Joy Cruz Sobrepena, eds.,
1995). For a discussion on a world-wide report on the similar rights violations, see
Amnesty International: Annual Report Summaries, Amnesty InternationalReport 1998,
M2 PRESSWIRE, June 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12975764.
265. See Mattei, supra note 40, at 10-11. Ugo Mattei compares the United States
Constitution to the Ethiopian Constitution in the following excerpt:
A cursory look to the constitution will give you the flavor of what I am talking
about: Art. 9 tells us that the Constitution is 'The supreme law of the land.' Art.
14 assumes the necessity of a trio of fundamental values: 'life liberty and
property' becomes 'Life liberty and the security of the person.' Art. 19
introduces the Miranda warning made famous in the American movies: the
Ethiopian person arrested has 'A right to remain silent and to be notified that
any statement that they make or evidence they give may be used against them in
court.' The 'right to privacy' is not only generally guaranteed (art. 26) but also
specifically to the accuse (art. 20). 'Double Jeopardy' is prohibited (art. 23). Of
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and characteristics of Ethiopia demonstrate that they support the
ideals and workings of the Constitution; they do not work against
it.

A. Western Characteristicsof The Ethiopian Constitution
26 6
The United States' and Ethiopian Constitutions are similar.

The Ethiopian Constitution is essentially Western. 267 This quality,
in and of itself, has been viewed as a detraction. 268 Not only does

course 'the equal protection of the law (art. 25) .... Many other examples of
American constitutional language can be found.
Talking about fashionable provisions (within the American academia) we will
find that the press should not only be free but 'diverse' (art. 29,4); women are
entitled to 'affirmative' action in order to 'compete on the basis of equality with
men in political economic and social life' (art. 35,3).
Id.
266. Perhaps the "western" connotation is fading and becoming the norm. Virtually all
constitutions nowadays, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, Russia and other regions
have similar provisions protecting rights with wording and/or concepts akin to the United
State's Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Even countries where individual rights are
known to be routinely infringed or unexercised have these rights in their respective
constitutions. In some of these countries, restrictive provisions are present to give the
government legal leverage to excuse right infringement. The restrictive clause may use
such wording as "determined by law" or "unless it threatens the public health or safety."
It must be noted that although these Constitutions have loopholes, in countries such as the
United States the government can routinely limit rights on these very same grounds
whether it is mentioned or not. It is perhaps the political culture and social self-concept of
the nation that is most determinative of the rights' implementation. Note the applicable
provisions in the following constitutions which protect such private virtues of freedom of
the press, freedom of association, freedom of expression and equal treatment. See CONGO
CONST. arts. 10-65; EGYPT CONST. arts. 40-63. "No person may be arrested, inspected,
detained or have his freedom restricted in any way or be prevented from free movement
except by an order necessitated by investigations and the preservation of public safety.")
Id. art. 41; ERI. CONST. arts. 14-29, (there are no restrictions within each right until
Article 28 which states that the rights can be restricted in certain instances), id.; IRAN
CONST. arts. 19-42. Contrary to most preconceptions of individual rights in Iran, there is
an exhaustive list of rights from personal beliefs to rights of assembly. The stumbling
block is if the exercise of the right violates public order or principles of Islam which can be
vague and always arguable. Again, essentially, it's the political culture and social selfconcept that defines the right. See id. Note Article 23 "Freedom of Belief": "The
investigation of individuals' beliefs if forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to
task simply for holding a certain belief." Id. art. 23; LIBYA CONST. arts 12, 13, 14 (The
rights in the Libyan Constitution really are almost non-existent, but the Constitution itself
is very short.); RuSS. CONST. arts 17--64 (listing an exhaustive array of rights); RWANDA
CONST. arts. 12-33; ZAMBIA CONST. arts 11-26.
267. See Mattei, supra note 40, at 9-10. "Indeed the impact of American constitutional
rhetoric is staggering." Id.
268. See Id.
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the Ethiopian Constitution have content similar to the United
States Constitution, such as a federalist design and protection of
liberties, but United States common law interpreting the
Constitution is actually implemented in the Ethiopian Constitution
itself. For example, a provision mimicking Miranda rights, which
is only a small part of United States Constitutional case law, is
269
included directly in the text of the Ethiopian Constitution.
Professor Haile's assertion that Ethiopia is still experiencing
economic strife and no actual enforcement of individual or
democratic liberties is correct. 270 The problems, however, are not
271
rooted in the Constitution or its demarcation with ethnicity.
Neither is the problem rooted in the failure to properly follow the
western federalism recipe. 272 Such conclusions are difficult to
support when an article is published barely a year after the
Constitution was officially ratified. The United States Department
of State on January 30, 1997, and on January 30, 1998 issued
reports on human rights practices. 273 These reports, along with
some news reports, shed light on how Ethiopia and its Constitution
are adapting to the first democracy in Ethiopia's history.
Although Haile relied on a 1996 U.S. State Department Report, it
was published a year earlier, and the information was presumably
gathered months before it was actually issued. 274 As Mattei points
out,275 laws in Ethiopia cannot be analogized to laws applied in
Western societies such as the United States. Almost all critics
warn that the federal nature of the Constitution is weak and that

269. See ETH. CONST. art 19; see also id.
270. For a discussion on the abuses of the past regimes and how the current regime is
struggling with problems, but remains the best alternative thus far, see Jonathan
Dimbleby, Feeding on Ethiopia's Famine: "If we are guilty of genocide, Dimbleby, you
should be here with us." He wasn'tjoking, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 8, 1998, at 5.

271. See generally Haile, supra note 40.
272. See generally Mattei, supra note 40.
273. See 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146; Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for
1996
(January
30,
1997)
(visited
Nov.
1,
1998)
<http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/ethiopia.htm> [hereinafter "1996 State Dep't Report"].
274. See, e.g., Haile, supra note 40, at 8, n.25; U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports of Human Rights Practices for 1995, 78-79 (U.S. Government Printing Office
1996).
275. For a discussion of Mattei's evaluation of the Ethiopian Constitution in a larger
context, see

MODELLI
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the Constitution dangerous relies on ethnicity as the standard for
many of its determinations. 276 Although a reliance on ethnicity is
perhaps not the best method for making determinations, it does
serve some useful purposes for the time being. Specifically, it such
reliance minimizes the dangers due to Ethiopia's unitarial nature.
Furthermore, it allows for the release of tensions that would
otherwise build up if Ethiopia became too centralized or
nationalistic after hundreds of years of monarchal rule, and a
decade of dictatorial rule, during which one ethnic culture was
dominant.
One weakness of the Ethiopian Constitution is that it does
not follow some of the better aspects of the United States
Constitution. The problem is not that the vague western principles
are not being properly followed, 277 or that the United States'
Constitution is not followed exactly. 278 Rather, the Ethiopian
Constitution is too complex. Ethiopia, like many African and
Middle Eastern countries, has borrowed heavily from civil law
countries such as France. 279 Civil law, unlike common law
countries, which have more complex, detailed law, tends to be
more simple.280 Although it would seem that laws from civil law
countries would tend to be more simple, that is not the case here.
Mattei is correct in asserting that culture is an important
281
consideration to the application of the Ethiopian Constitution.
Although cultural considerations are a significant factor, Mattei's
analysis is not on point. The use of the term "western" alone does
not make the application difficult.
Rather, the underlying
principles distinguish the different cultures.
For example,
principles of individuality and freedom, instead of Ethiopia's
tradition of monarchal rule, 282 should not be viewed as "western"

276. See generally Haile, supra note 40; Mattei, supra note 40; Abbink, supra note 40.
277. See Mattei, supra note 40, at 1-3, 17-19.
278. See, e.g., Haile, supra note 40, at 10, 50.
279. See, e.g., Mattei, supra note 40, at 10. "After all, the U.S. Constitution has always
been the most influential constitutional document in the world." Id
280. The analogy taken by the author from a guest lecture given by the Dean of
Beijing Law School in China at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law in
International Business Transactions (Fall 1997).
281. See generally Mattei, supra note 40.
282. Mattei provides the following statement that to a western thinker who has
experienced western freedom, the fundamental flaw of his proposition; he believes
Ethiopians cannot "handle" the rights granted to them by their "Western" Constitution:
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just because they originated in strong western legal roots. Even
the western origins began283in cultures with a strong history of
oppressive monarchal rule.
The strength of the United States Constitution is that it is
simple, yet its structure allows it to grow and adapt to the evolving
social and political processes. The United States Constitution
remains the longest surviving constitution, and many countries
have replicated its effect. Its effectiveness, however, is not simply
because it is a product of a "western" culture. Rather, it is the
underlying principles of a free and open society that establishes
the constitution's effectiveness. Thus, its principles have been
adapted to very diverse cultures with great success. For example,
after the Allied Occupation of Japan,284 a very "un-Western"
culture, and Germany, 285 both countries adopted constitutions
strongly influenced by the United States' Constitution.
Furthermore, they continue to thrive while retaining their unique
cultural characteristics.
Due to technological advances in
association with freer political movements and governmental
structures, societies around the globe are gaining freedom.
Contrary to Mattei and Haile's cultural reasoning, the
ethnicity aspect of the Constitution will be a relief of ethnic
tension, rather than a problem. 286 Moreover, you can apply
principles of United States constitutional law to Ethiopia and
Africa. In the ethnic considerations, however, the Constitution
"A strong and ideological assertiveness of rights can have a very destabilizing impact on
the Ethiopian society." Mattei, supra note 40, at 15.
283. See id. at 5. "It is likely that the result of this constitutional evolution, inherently
foreign to the African structure of power and decision making, will simply result in
another piece of unapplied written legislation;" Id.
284. After Japan's defeat and the Allied occupation, Japan's Constitution took on
many attributes of the United States' Constitution:
The new Constitution was an alien import. It spoke of the individual's goals as
'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' (article 13) and had to inform the
Japanese public that the 'fundamental human rights by this Constitution
guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle by man to be
free' (article 97).
ROGER BUCKLEY, JAPAN TODAY 10 (2d ed., 1990).
285. The German Constitution, after the Allied occupation, took on many
characteristics of the American Constitution. See HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR.,
GERMANY FROM POLITICS TO REUNIFICATION 33-43 (1992).
286. Abbink seems to agree with this proposition. "The formula of ethnicization
(although in a different, more effective, federal form) should perhaps be encouraged ......
Abbink, supra note 40, at 174.
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must protect democracy and individual rights in the process, as
Specifically, Abbink states that ethnicity
Abbink concludes.
should be encouraged if:
[F]irst, it is generally interpreted and implemented as liberation
and democratization; secondly, it is sustained also in the domain
of respecting individual human rights within the ethno-regions;
thirdly, it works in the economic domain: and finally, it is a
of mind accepted by the "rural masses," the
tendency 28and
7 frame
majority.
Ethiopia, while struggling to better human and individual rights, is
also battling to improve in many other ways.
1. Cultural Strongholds and Physical Limitations in Implementing
Ethiopia's Constitution
At first glance, the Ethiopian Constitution appears to take
In
some admirable lessons from the United States Constitution. 288
fact, it goes even further in defining particular human rights.
For example, while the United States has a well-developed body of
constitutional law, particularly defining individual rights, most of
its interpretation is of the Bill of Rights. In contrast, the Ethiopian
Constitution goes further by placing them at the constitutional,
rather than common law, level. Thus, Miranda rights, determined
by the United States Supreme Court as necessary under the Fifth
Amendment, could later be found to fall outside of constitutional
be the case in Ethiopia absent a
protection. This would never
289
Constitutional Amendment.
In the United States Constitution, part of the Framer's design
of the Constitution was simplicity. This simplicity, however, can
also lend itself to much danger; government-sanctioned
segregation in public schools was constitutionally permissible in
one moment in time, 290 and then constitutionally incompatible the

287. Id.
288. This proposition stems from the fact that while in reality the Constitutional
freedoms in the United States are stronger than in Ethiopia, the rights in Ethiopia are in
the Constitution itself rather than in case law interpreting the Constitution as in the
United States.
289. Fundamental rights change over time in the United States, as noted by the
"Separate but Equal" doctrine which was eventually overturned, by slave emancipation,
and by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting slavery.
290. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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next. 291
There is also a danger in being too detailed. The Ethiopian
Constitution may go to this extreme. One must assume a certain
level of social control of the government. Change in societal
attitude is a factor to consider- the government does not simply
make a decision. A common law system reflects society's morals,
politics and attitudes. This common law in turn affects the
legislative output. 292 If the constitutional structure is too rigid,
however, the rights may be limited to only what is precisely
delineated. Those rights then become the only rights, and even
their current limited interpretation could be further narrowed. In
such a case, the listed rights become ineffective, and certainly less
effective than a Constitution that contains simple rights with wide
293
interpretation.
2. "Fashionable" Human Rights Provisions Too Complex for
Proper Implementation
Individual rights, personal liberties, and democratic rights,
while listed exhaustively and protected throughout the Ethiopian
Constitution, 294 fail to be implemented. Human rights in the
Constitution certainly do not reflect the actual existence of such
rights in Ethiopia, but the government has been attempting to
make the Constitutional prerogatives a reality:
The government took a number of steps to improve its human
rights practices, but serious problems remain. Security forces
sometimes beat or mistreated detainees, and arbitrarily arrested
and detained citizens. Prolonged pretrial detention is a
problem. The judiciary lacks sufficient staff and funds, and
consequently most citizens are denied the full protections
provided in the Constitution. The government restricts
freedom of the press and detained or imprisoned 14 journalists.
At year's end, most were accused or convicted of inciting ethnic
291. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
292. These changes are evident in United States constitutional law generally. Changes
in the United States Supreme Court compound this effect. See, e.g. GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xxi (12th ed. 1991). "Constitutional law today is in a state of flux,
prompted in large part by the changes in the composition of the Court...." Id
293. Compare the United States Constitution, and the commonly understood freedoms
in the United States, to the Ethiopian Constitution, its listed rights and its present human
rights record. See supra text accompanying notes 182-91, and infra notes 296-97.
294. See ETH. CONST. arts. 13-44.
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hatred or publishing false information in violation of 1992 Press
Law. The government limits freedom of association and
refused to register several nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), but otherwise did not prevent them from operating.
Societal discrimination and violence against women and abuse
of children remain problems; female genital mutilation is nearly
universal.29 5Societal discrimination against disabled persons is a
problem.

Since these rights take up over half the Constitution, 296 it is
evident that the failure of these rights does not lie in the
Constitution's construction, or in the division between state and

federal power.

297

295. 1996 State Dep't Report, supra note 273, at 1-2.
296. To be tedious, between "half" and a "third," the "half" approximation comprises
not only the text of the Constitution, but the significance of the Preamble and General
Provisions. Some authors state that individual rights comprise one-third of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Haile, supra note 40, at 53. Whether a "third" or "half," the
importance the Constitution places on human and democratic rights is enormous.
297. Haile's analysis of the Ethiopian Constitution goes too far to be objective. He
even criticized the Constitution for putting international environmental concerns ahead of
Ethiopia's own! See id. at 69-77. Certainly Professor Haile does not consider Ethiopia's
long term future nor would one want to put Professor Haile on a committee developing
regulations for third-world countries as they implement advanced industrialization.
Almost every provision is criticized without providing any alternative analysis (as is the
norm in legal analysis). For example, he expands at length that the only reason for the
"Ethiopian ethnic federation" is some sort of power control of the government and efforts
to divide and weaken Ethiopia. See id. at 43-45. He provides no alternative explanation,
such as the need for consideration of ethnic groups oppressed under Selassie's regime for
decades under the dominant Amhara ruling class and then under a communist
dictatorship. Oppressed for so long in Ethiopia's monarchal legacy; these ethnic groups
can now have more equal status. See ETH. CONST., preamble paras. 1-4 (referring to
"nationalities," "nations," and cultures of Ethiopia and that "our common destiny needs
to be based upon the rectification of historically distorted relationships.") For a discussion
on the motives of the drafters of the new Ethiopian Constitution, see James C. N. Paul,
Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional Orders: The Case of
Ethiopia, 3 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 236 (1994). James C. N. Paul is a professor of
law at Rutgers University School of Law in Newark, Trustee and Secretary of the
International Development Center for Law in New York. He was also the founding Dean
of the Law School of Addis Ababa. He has returned to Ethiopia on several occasions to
join the Constitutional Commission of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia charged
with preparing a draft constitution. See id. at n.1. Professor Paul states that "[tihe
Constitutional Commission of Ethiopia is explicitly charged with the task of producing a
draft constitution to establish democracy and human rights and a rule of law to secure those
conditions." Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added). Furthermore, after stating several human
rights goals, Professor Paul states that "[c]ertainly, these goals are professed by all political
factions now operating within and without Ethiopia, and probably also by the majority of
Ethiopians, most of who live in the countryside and derive their livelihood from
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Although the rights look impressive on paper, their
complexity is one of the Constitution's downfalls. Workers' rights,
for example, are explicitly protected. 298 Clearly, the protection of
each of these rights is very desirable, so how is this a negative?
When one drafts a constitution such as Ethiopia's, listing every
category of democratic 299 and human rights, 300 that Constitution is
doomed to fail. This failure is based on the Constitution's attempt
to develop a permanent policy for Ethiopia on issues that may or
may not need attention, or are even ripe, in comparison with more
urgent needs.
The Ethiopian Constitution contains a list of every objective
the government should implement, from the need to "care for and
rehabilitate the physically and mentally handicapped, the aged, the

agriculture." Id. at 237. It is these rural groups in agricultural areas who were never
represented; dominant group such as the Amhara, tend to live in urban areas. See Wube
Kumsa, Ethiopia the Beautiful (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wube.net/history.html>,
at 2. "The Amhara (who founded the nation), a highland people ... [who] occupy the
Ethiopian highlands ... and the former province of Shoa and as far S as Addis Ababa...
[whereas, for example, the] Golla, a pastoral and agricultural people living ... constituted
about one-third of the population." Id. Professor Haile, instead of presenting the obvious
arguments as to why Ethiopia chose to protect ethnic groups or create an "ethnic
federation," presents only arguments of speculation to the hidden alternatives without
looking at the facts in open view.
298. See ETH. CONST. art. 42.
299. "Democratic Rights" as they are termed and listed in the Ethiopian Constitution
with their title and respective article number are as follows: Right to Hold Opinions,
Thoughts and Free Expressions (art. 29), Freedom of Assembly, Public Demonstration
and the Right to Petition (art. 30), Right to Association (art. 31), Freedom of Movement
(art. 32), Rights of Citizenship (art. 33), Rights Relating to Marriage, the Individual and
the Family (art. 34), the Rights of Women (art. 35), the Rights of the Child (art. 36), the
Right to Justice (art. 37), the Right to Vote and be Elected (art. 38), the Right of Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples (art. 39), the Right to Property (art. 40), Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (art. 41), Workers' Rights (art. 42), the Right to Development (art. 43),
and the Right to the Protection of the Environment (art. 44). See ETH. CONST. arts. 2944.
300. "Human Rights" as they are termed and listed in the Ethiopian Constitution with
their title and respective article number are as follows: The Right to Life, Liberty and
Security of Person (art. 14), The Right to Life (art. 15), The Right to Security of Person
(art. 16), Liberty (art. 17), Prohibition of Inhuman Treatment (art. 18), Rights of Persons
Under Arrest (art. 19); Rights of the Accused (art. 20), Right of Persons in Custody and
Convicted Prisoners (art. 21), Non-retroactivity of Criminal Laws (art. 22), Prohibition of
Double Jeopardy (art. 23), Right to Human Dignity and Good Reputation (art. 24), The
Right to Equality (art. 25), the Right to Privacy (art. 26), Freedom of Religion, Conscience
and Thought (art. 27), and Crimes Against Humanity (art. 28). See ETH. CONST. arts. 1428.
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children deprived of their parents or guardians," 30 1 to the vague
"policies designed to create employment of the poor and
unemployed; issue programmes designed to open up work
30 2
opportunities in the public sector and undertake projects."
Many of these rights are extremely vague on what exactly the right
is and how the state should be implemented. For example, Article
40(3): "[t]he State may, in the public interest and in particular, to
ensure that Ethiopian citizens shall have an equal opportunity to
gain a living and an equal access to housing, determine the size of
ownership of both rural and urban land. ' 30 3 Each of these areas
are so ambitious and complex that if someone first brings it to the
attention of the State, or tries to litigate against the government
for its failure to implement a policy, the State can easily argue that
it has implemented the right to some remote degree. Thus, any
degree of government activity in the area could be viewed as
complying with the Constitution.
As another example, note the problematic provisions of
Article 41: "[e]very Ethiopian shall have the right to engage in any
economic activity and gain his living by work which he freely
chooses." 30 4 How would this right be protected? How is it
determined if one has in fact "freely" chosen his economic
activity?
The causes of action against the government for
violations to citizens claiming they were not afforded the
opportunity to freely choose their own economic activity are ad
infinatum. Also note Article 41(2): "Every Ethiopian shall have
the right to choose his vocation, work and profession." 30 5 There
are so many factors that affect a person "choosing" his career that
it is impossible to determine what degree of influence would be
acceptable.
The end result is that the government will basically not have
to abide by these provisions. The provisions are too specific on a
particular right, yet too vague and general to serve as a proper
measuring guide for implementation. A general right of pursuing
happiness or having economic freedom and the right to "equal"
housing, although seemingly more "broad" or " vague," would
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

ETH. CONST. art.
Id. art. 41(6).
ETH. CONST. art.
ETH. CONST. art.
ETH. CONST. art.

41(5).
40 (alternative supported by the minority of the council) 3.
41.
41(2).
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have a specific standard for measure.
Instead of a list of rights, the Constitution's list is more akin
to mere resolutions. 30 6 It can be argued that the Constitution
merely requires more definitive legislation, and that when such a
governmental prerogative is rooted in the Constitution it must be
broad. These rights, however, are simply too broad and vague to
form the basis for more detailed legislation.
With the implementation of the Constitution, do the policies
outlined in the Constitution then become the sole objective of the
government? The primary ones? The secondary ones? Which
policies should be implemented before other ones? What about
pressing needs, such as individual rights being hampered because
of the war with Eritrea, that are not specifically enumerated?
What is the fate of these policies that are barely implemented now,
and may continue to fail to be implemented for the next five to
twenty years? It would probably take a strong social or political
movement to bring life to these rights. By failing to implement
these rights now, the result will be a weak list of rights which are
too detailed and vague to ever be used. They are too specific to a
particular class of people, with no measuring aspect to determine
whether the government is doing its job of protecting the rights. A
right should not be, for an extreme example, "the government
should do everything to help X." Individual rights and freedoms
are riddled in a similar fashion throughout the Constitution, 30 7 so
that it reads as if it protects an elaborate list of rights, but no
definitive semantics are used to establish whether the right is being
violated.
The truth is, when a country starts out with a "laundry list" of
policies to implement, it will fail. Instead, there should be a short
simple list of rights that can be measured as to whether the
government is protecting them. These rights should be immortal,
not policies that may become more or less important over time.
Societies, governments, and individuals must function on an
"as needed" basis. Certain issues are ripe and a priority depending
on the circumstances. A nation such as Ethiopia, which lacks the

306. Some of the best examples of these "resolutions" in the Ethiopian Constitution
are found in Article 41, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."
307. See ETH. CONST. arts. 14-28.
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infrastructure for strong industry, and even education, 30 8 will not
prioritize equal access for the handicapped. 30 9 Note Mattei's
description of this dilemma and his analogy similar to the
proposition:
Talking about fashionable provisions (within the American
Academia) we will find that the press should not only be free
but 'diverse' (art 29,4); women are entitled to 'affirmative'
action in order to be able to compete on the basis of equality
with men in political and social life' (art. 35,3). The problems
that may arise from the competition between men and women
should be resolved 'in the best interest of the child' (art. 36,2).
Ethiopians should have a 'Right of Access to justice' which, of
course, can be effective only with the introduction of class
actions (art 37,2). A right to a 'clean and healthy environment'
(art. 44) completes the list of the rights formulated with
academic rhetoric. Other non-American fashionable ideas find
their way into the Constitution: between the Scandinavian idea
of the 'ombudsman' (art 55,15) which in the eighties became a
'must' for any proposal claiming to be progressive. The right to
'sustainable development,' whatever it may mean, found its way
into the Constitution as well. A very progressive section on
difcult for a Scandinavian
social rights is added. It would be 31
country to afford its implementation. U

One right at issue in Ethiopia is the protection of the disabled.
There are many disabled persons as a result of the war in Ethiopia.
Although some mechanisms have been established, such as those
put in place by the Amhara Development Association and the
Tigray Development Association which are designed to help
disabled war veterans, the government has been able to enforce
neither the Constitutional provisions nor a 1994 law which
provides additional rights for the disabled. 3 11 "The Government
does not have sufficient resources to mandate access to buildings

308. Mengistu began to implement a mixed economy before he left power, however,
industry in Ethiopia, productivity decreased heavily in the 1980's and observers expect the
trend to continue throughout the 1990s. ETHIOPIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 1, at
187. "In the early 1990s, the problems Ethiopians faced in making their educational
system responsive to national needs remained formidable." Id. at 126. "[In 1961 t]he
Ethiopian education system was ranked at the bottom among African nations." Id. at 127.
309. See ETH. CONsT. art. 41(5).
310. See Mattei, supra note 40, at 10-11 (emphasis added).
311. See 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 10.
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or government services for persons with disabilities, and people
with
minor
disabilities
sometimes
complain
of job
discrimination." 312 Thus, this is an example of a specific, detailed
right that has failed to be implemented.
The Constitution attempts to list out every aspect of an ideal
society.
In the meantime, however, Ethiopia must address
problems such as its war with Eritrea, and providing food and
education for its population. 313 It must develop its industrial and
agricultural infrastructure. These are the needs that must be
addressed, whether or not listed in the Constitution. Huge
sections of the Constitution will potentially be ignored for a time.
What will be their value later? While the country struggles to
survive and rise in Africa, 314 it has a Constitution with policies it
cannot now implement, with the effect of ignoring rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Haile states that, despite the exhaustive array of rights in the
Ethiopian Constitution, they are rendered meaningless because
315
the government can restrict these rights in a time of emergency.
Virtually all governments, however, have this capability. 316 In the
United States, for example, if martial law was declared, the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment could certainly be
suspended as well. On the other hand, an American's reaction to
this proposition would be strong, despite its legitimacy, because
the American culture views such a possibility as abhorrent to the
political system. Perhaps Haile means to say that Ethiopian
history and political culture make Ethiopia more susceptible to
such a possibility than other democracies. Rights are being
ignored because Ethiopia is preoccupied with its adjustment to a
new system free from monarchal rule. Ignoring rights is not really
a complex legal problem; it may just be that Ethiopia lacks many
resources 317 due to its underdeveloped industrial and educational
312. Id.
313. These are among the biggest host of issues with Ethiopia currently.
314. "Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world." Haile, supra note 40, at
66.
315. I. at 46.
316. See, e.g., supra note 266.
317. The problems as outlined by the U.S. State Department Report are not
necessarily constitutionally related, but are rather problems related to the of lack of
resources. The State Department Report discusses a right, its violation, and why the
author thinks it has been violated-most often from lack of resources and a viable
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infrastructure. 318
A Constitution, being the "DNA" of a nation, should set
forth the basic structure of government so that the political
"organism" can grow and adapt to the environment it encounters.
The United States Constitution envisioned growth, such as the
opening of the West and New Frontier, from its first drafting.
Imagine a provision in the United States in 1789 providing for
equal access for the handicapped? While Ethiopia is not in the
same technological or industrial state as the early United States, it
shares enough of a lack of infrastructure for education and
industry that the analogy serves its purpose; in 1990, Ethiopia had
"one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world. ' 319 What
would happen to such a provision if in the original United States
Constitution?
What if the Constitution had more of such
provisions? The economic, social and cultural rights included in
Article 41 may become mere surplusage.
Unlike the early United States, the Ethiopian government
was already functioning when the Ethiopian Constitution was
adopted. Must the Government, faced with the laundry list of
policies in the Constitution, redirect its energy to following those

judiciary or legal enforcement structure.
The Government's goals is a decentralized system that brings justice closer to
the people; in practice, however, severe shortages of adequately trained
personnel in many regions, as well as serious financial constraints, combine to
keep the judiciary weak and overburdened and to deny most citizens the full
protections provided for in the Constitution. Hundreds of individuals were
detained, especially in the Oromo and Somali regions, without charge. Many
were ultimately released without explanation or appearance before a judge.
Such cases at times may reflect arbitrary actions on the part of heavy-handed
local officials, but also result from a shortage of trained and competent
prosecutors and judges. The Government established regional offices of the
Ministry of Justice to monitor local judicial developments, but the federal
presence in the regions remained limited. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
some local officials interpret decentralization to mean they are no longer
accountable to any higher authority, even within their own regions.
1996 State Dep't Report, supra note 273, at 4.
318. Culture is having a significant impact on the implementation of the Constitution.
The United States Department of State has stated that "[a] history of highly centralized
authority, great poverty, the recent civil conflict and unfamiliarity with democratic culture
all combine to complicate the implementation of federalism." Id at 1. Also, "[tihe
federal government cannot yet protect constitutional rights at the regional level especially
when local authorities are unwilling or unable to do so. Local administrative, police, and
judicial systems remain weak in many regions." Id
319. ETHIOPIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 1, at 145.
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policies? Are they prioritized? The reality is that the Government
will continue implementing its current policies; the policies in the
Constitution will be looked to as an ideal, and policies to be dealt
with when the Government can afford to implement them. For
example, looking at Article 41(6), to what degree is the right
violated? Would it ever reach the Constitutional Court or Federal
Council? The result is that sections of the Constitution that sound
very good at first reading will never be implemented or have any
"bite." Additionally, policies that may or may not be consistent
with the times are forever locked into Ethiopian Constitutional
law.
Until Ethiopia's standard of living improves to a level where
Ethiopia can redirect its resources beyond the simple necessities of
living, many of the policies may lie dormant. They will, however,
continue to exist and perhaps one day soon will be implementedit may only take one action to start a trend in Ethiopia's
Constitutional law that reinvigorates its array of rights.
B. The Complex Method of ConstitutionalInterpretation
The Ethiopian Constitution promotes its dangerous nature
even further because its formula for constitutional interpretation is
much too complex. Contrary to Haile's assertion, 320 judicial
review by the United States Supreme Court is not provided for by
the United States Constitution. 321 It has simply been interpreted
that way. 322 Though it makes a great deal of sense and has been
held consistent with the Constitution, there is an argument that the
Framers intent was for all branches of government to have a
significant role in constitutional interpretation. 323 For example,
perhaps the United States President's role in implementing what
he believes to be unconstitutional would be different under this
320. "In the United States, '[tihrough judicial review, the Supreme Court most
dramatically exerts its authority to determine what the Constitution means.., the Court
has routinely exercised the power of judicial review to determine the constitutionality of
acts of Congress, the executive branch, and the states."' Haile, supra note 40, at 55-56
citing KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 357 (1995).

321. Judicial review of acts or law of the executive and Congress are not explicitly
provided for in the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
322. See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 292, at 2-37 (discussing issues related to judicial
review and Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803)).
323.

See, e.g., NORMAN RELICH & BENARD SCHWARTZ, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1,

7-8 (1983).
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approach. 324 The fact that the Ethiopian Constitution requires
that a particular governmental body determine whether an act or
law is unconstitutional is not in itself abhorrent to United States
constitutional principles. Judicial review of legislative actions for
constitutionality even at the state level, has indeed proven itself
successful, it is so ingrained that some forget that the United States
Constitution may not have intended that consequence.
Where the Ethiopian Constitution fails is in the complexity of
the system it sets out for constitutional interpretation. One may
even be a little suspicious that a provision about who picks what
seat, and the majority of seats being granted to essentially a nonlegislative body, should be in the Constitution at all. To Haile's
credit, he is correct that the formation of the Ethiopian
325
Constitution does come from suspiciously biased circumstances.
The judicial section of the United States Constitution is quite brief
and, has remained remarkably stable, efficient, and trusted. The
judicial system in Ethiopia, on the other hand, has some serious
326
problems.
The Federal Council is not per se evil to the Ethiopian
system, at least not to the extent Professor Haile states. One
question, however, is why it exists less democratically than the
more legislative People's Council. The Federal Council seems to
be an "elevated" or more prestigious body, just as the Senate is in
the United States, possessing strong characteristics of the power to
324. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR, JESSE H. CHOPER & STEVEN
H. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (7th ed., 1991), citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, 8

THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (1897).
325. See Haile, supra note 40, at 8-10 (describing the influence of the Tigre People's
Liberation Front over the transitional government of Ethiopia and the reports by
international bodies that the election was "rigged."). This situation was verified by the
U.S. Department of State in its report which states in its opening paragraph:
Ethiopia continued its transition from a unitary to a federal system of
government. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi leads the government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which was elected in 1995 to replace a
transitional government that was established following a long and brutal civil
war. Most opposition groups boycotted the elections, and candidates affiliated
with the dominant party within the transitional government, the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won a landslide victory in
national and regional contests. The EPRDF is in turn dominated by the Tigray
People's Liberation Front (TPLF).
1996 State Dep't Report, supra note 273, at 1.
326. See 1996 State Dep't Report, supra note 273, at 1. "The judiciary is weak and
overburdened, but showed signs of independence." Id.
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make constitutional interpretation. Its detachment from popular
votes could be good for constitutional review, just as the arguably
non-political nature by which Justices of the United States
Supreme Court are nominated, free from the politics of
campaigning and political favors. 327 It is also true, however, that
the Federal Council is larger in number, and controlled by the
populace to a greater degree 328 than the United States Supreme
Court, theoretically subjecting it to more popular control and
making it less of an oligarchy than the United States Supreme
Court. 329 In practice, however, the reverse is true. The body of
the Federal Council, indirectly elected by the populace, has
resulted in more politics, dilution, and influencing of
Constitutional issues than the nine members of the United States
Supreme Court who are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. This is especially true when there is not
only the Federal Council deciding issues of Constitutional
interpretation, but the Constitutional Court as well.
Although the Constitutional Court is not the final decisionmaker, it has the potential to block Ethiopian Constitutional
interpretation. This complexity poses serious danger with two
levels of decision-making for what supposedly is one decision. On
one hand, the Ethiopian Constitution attempts to throw everything
into the Constitution. On the other hand, this complex system of
constitutional interpretation is incorporated into two bodies of
indirectly elected decision-makers. The United States model of
judicial review would be more ideal for Ethiopia. Africa already
has enough corruption in government, and the last thing it, or any
country for that matter, needs is another temptation of
government complexity.
What makes the United States system ideal is that there are
nine justices in the spotlight.330 Each one renders a vote or
opinion in the matter. These opinions are then published in
newspapers across the United States, and discussed in hundreds of
United States law schools. Each opinion also becomes the law,

327.
328.
329.
330.
CONST.

See supra text accompanying notes 137-57.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-19.
See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
Congress determines the number of Justices on the Supreme Court. See U.S.
art. III, § 1.

1999]

Ethiopian ConstitutionalLaw

449

albeit, to varying degrees. 331 In the Ethiopian system, however,
the Constitutional Court is a sort of certiorari-granting mechanism
with no final power to decide the case. 332 Eventually, the granting
and denying of certiorari will pattern Ethiopian Constitutional law
as it does United States Constitutional law.
One ponders whether the drafters of the Ethiopian
Constitution anticipated major issues arising in Constitutional
interpretation.
This seems uncanny considering that the
Constitution contains so much detail in defining individual rights
and freedoms. Presently, the problems seem to lie with whether
issues of Constitutionality will ever reach the Constitutional Court
333
as violations occur.
1. Ethnicity as a Consideration in the Ethiopian Federal System
The issue of ethnicity is not discussed as an internal
constitutional issue, as were the previous issues, but rather as a
policy underlying the design of the Constitution.
Because
Ethiopia's Constitution divides its states based on concentrations
of ethnic population, many commentators have feared that this
"ethnic federation" gives ethnic groups too much autonomy,
334
placing the integrity of the federal system at risk.
Several African nations, and even the former Soviet
Republics, are experiencing severe problems and war because of
ethnic clashes. The power the Ethiopian Constitution gives to
ethnic groups is feared to spur ethnic clashes within Ethiopia, or at
the very least, create an inefficient government. Although this
ethnic consideration is a potential problem, it has not become one
to date. When one considers the homogeneity of Ethiopia
throughout history, despite its wide array of languages and ethnic
groups, 335 Ethiopia will always be one unified nation. 336 Even the
331. A strong majority opinion will carry more weight than the persuasive power of a
weak majority opinion, concurring opinions or dissenting opinions.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
334. This forms the basis of many of Professor Haile's propositions. See Haile, supra
note 40, at 19-22, 31, 52.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26
336. MARCUS, supra note 14, at 218-19.
What can new rulers learn from Ethiopia's long history? They can take heart
that, notwithstanding the most extreme cases of secession and governmental
weakness, the country reunited. There is no-escaping the essential wholeness of
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borderlands remain linked to Ethiopia despite the long history of
diversity. This history, and Ethiopia's ability to adopt to it, may in
337
fact stabilize the country.
Much of this dilemma is cultural. Contrary to many critics,
who see potential trouble for Ethiopia because the Constitution
does not adequately rely on a Western model, much of the
problems rest on Africa's current political and cultural
environment.
One cannot compare the ethnic dilemmas 338
of
Ethiopia to those of Canada, the United States, or Australia.
All have good federal systems of government, but all are young
countries, only created in the last 200 years, the original
populations were homogenous, and the native population was
suppressed and/or absorbed into their culture. Moreover, these

Ethiopia's highlands and environs. The two have functioned as an economic
unit historically, and there seems little reason to think that modern politics can
disrupt the long-standing pattern.

Id.
337. Pankhurst discusses the link of the borderlands of Ethiopia to the core of
Ethiopia throughout history:
The people's of the periphery were involved moreover in most, if not all, of the
great migrations, as well as the major political and religious conflicts of the time.
Many inhabitants of the borderlands as of the central core traveled widely, in
peace or war, as soldiers on campaign or garrison duty, itinerant merchants,
officers of the state, tax collectors, refugees, petitioners, prisoners, priests,
monks, wandering students, pilgrims or slaves.
Innumerable social linguistic, and cultural differences between the various
peoples of the region of course remained, but there were also importantpoints of
contact, both peaceful and warlike. These resulted in a vast amount of
assimilation of populations, both slave and free, very considerable adoption of
languages, innumerable conversions from one faith to another (and often back
again!), and extensive intermarriage, often, but by no means only for dynastic
reasons.
PANKHURST, supra note 23, at 443 (emphasis added).
338. Ethnic issues often lurk below the surface of many countries in the news today,
including Canada.
ITihe greatest risks of starting future wars will likely be those associated with
ethnic disputes and the new nationalism that seems to be increasing in many
areas .... The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are being torn by ethnic
desires for self-government; ethnic-like religious demands are fueling new
nationalism in Israel and the Islamic nations; ethnic pressures are reasserting
themselves again in Canadian politics; and throughout the Pacific Basin...
ethnic issues often lurk just beneath the surface.
Aaron P. Micheau, The 1991 TransitionalCharterof Ethiopia: A New Application of the
Self-Determination Principle?,28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 367 (1996) (citing John H.
Barton & Barry E. Carter, InternationalLaw and Institutionsfor a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J.
535,555-56 (1993)).
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"transplanted" populations already had a heritage of what is today
described as the "Anglo-American" system of government. Thus,
you have a homogenous population transplanted to a great
expanse of land, the Americas and Australia, which required a
governmental structure suitable for growth in these great land
areas. If it was not suited for such growth, the inevitable growth
would make the legal structure conform to it, as perhaps the
Constitutional law has developed. There were also populations
that were more or less homogenous by religion; they were almost
entirely Christian.
They were also populations that fled
persecution, and thus desired to instill religious and personal
freedom in their legal framework. Furthermore, they had a desire
to be free from monarchal governments.
Professor Haile's analogies to systems of government other
than that of Ethiopia, therefore, are misplaced. Russia and India
make good comparisons as they are large federations with histories
of strong ethnic division and their systems of federalism maintain
stable forms of government amidst potential conflict. Haile also
points to more western styles of federalism that Ethiopia should
follow. Although he states that the homogeneous nature of
nations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia results in
inaccurate analogies, he still refers to their styles of government.
Governments such as Australia and the United States have
managed to repress ethnic minorities in the guise of a "non-ethnic"
constitution. As seen with the Thirteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, an amendment was needed to make
the Constitution truly "non-ethnic."
Australia horrifically
repressed the Aborigines in a fashion similar to the United States'
near eradication of its Native American population. Thus, an
"ethnically blind" Ethiopian Constitution could be dangerous
because history has shown that constitutions can ignore ethnic
groups and oppress them at the same time. With Ethiopia's
history of Amharic domination, if the new Constitution ignored
ethnic considerations a single group could dominate and oppress
minority rural groups.
With respect to Russia and India, their histories are not
analogous. First, India has a tradition of unified religion and
isolation from the rest of the world. Its geographic location as a
"sub-continent" adds to this fact. The separation of Pakistan from
India demonstrates that extreme religious differences can create
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secession. Ethiopia is not a sub-continent, but is in the middle of
the largest continent in the world. Nations experiencing war, and a
host of other societal problems, surround Ethiopia and inevitably
bleed into its inner workings. India has a unique historical
unification and stabilization.
While it is true that India's
Constitution has more unitary mechanisms such as those
respecting language, a point that Haile criticizes the Ethiopian
Constitution for failing to address, British rule unified India and
spread English throughout the land. In fact, English almost
supersedes Hindi.
In Ethiopia, only sixty percent of the
population knows Amharic. It is not therefore a matter of
difference over constitutional rhetoric on language, but a
difference in fact; the fact that most Indians already know English
is a unifying factor irrespective of their Constitution's text. If
there had been similar conditions in Ethiopia, surely the framers of
the Constitution would have considered the possibility of a
national language. For the framers to do as Haile suggests,
however, would have created a volatile situation where one
national language would have to be chosen over all others. The
way the Ethiopian Constitution was drafted, Amharic is given
precedence, but other languages are provided their due respect.
Thus, conflict is diffused.
With respect to Russia the language is already spoken by the
majority of the population, as English is in India. The extent of
ethnic diversity is also different from Ethiopia. Additionally,
Russian culture dominated the former Soviet Union, and is a
powerful unifying force in the now independent nation. Thus,
Haile failed to look at these Constitutions beyond their wording.
Granted, these are excellent considerations and it is indeed
important for Ethiopia to be unified for its most efficient
functioning, but it is overly simplistic to say that the Ethiopian
Constitution should borrow provisions from Russia and India.
These provisions in Russia and India function because they reflect
what is already a cultural fact. In Ethiopia, a decision would have
to be made on what the national language should be. Such a
decision would be difficult considering Ethiopia has been ruled,
without democratic freedom, for so long by the Amharic.
Additionally, it would result in a national language that all
Ethiopians did not know; Amharic is a very complicated language,
and may not be the best choice for Ethiopia. If, on the other hand,
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eighty to ninety percent of Ethiopians were fluent in Amharic, this
decision would be much easier.
Professor John Van Doren has discussed some issues
concerning Ethiopia that go beyond the mere applications of
positive law.33 9 He states that Ethiopia, like many African nations,
has relied on customary law to such a high degree that
approaching the Ethiopian Constitution in terms of the proper
application of "positive law" may be flawed.340 According to some
positivist standards, Ethiopia's legal system fails because of the
absence of rules of recognition, that is, legal sources commonly
accepted by officials and judges as "authoritative for determining
primary rules." 341 Van Doren believes that a legal system that
merely rests on its written guidelines is a myth.3 4 2 Rather, it is the
culture behind such writings that actually determine the rules of
the government. 343 He concludes that instead of emphasizing a
written code, these underlying principles must themselves be
344
instilled into Ethiopia.
With this in mind, it becomes difficult to compare Ethiopia
with the United States, Canada and Australia (three nations that
developed almost "out of nowhere" relatively recently), and argue
that all of Ethiopia's problems will disappear if it follows the blue
print of these Western models. Ethiopia is the cradle of all of
humanity, the nation from which Lucy came. Its ethnic groups
form a deep-rooted tradition for all of humanity. Their religions
are not just different versions of Christianity, but are composed of
Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Moreover, all three of these
religions are strongly influenced by their pagan roots.
A Constitution must take into consideration the culture in
which it is implemented. The Ethiopian culture is one that, like
many African nations, puts a great deal of concern on human
relationships, often elevating them above economic or social
progress in various areas. At the same time, however, concern for
the dignity of diverse ethnic groups will greatly benefit the nation
as a whole. Thus, the emphasis the Ethiopian Constitution places
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See Van Doren, supra note 39.
See id. at 165, 187, 201-04.
Id. at 165.
See icL at 194-96.
See id.
See Van Doren, supra note 39, at 203--04.
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on human rights and democracy can be seen as the result of
Ethiopian culture implementing what it believes to be important
345
into a western "format.
To say, as Mattei and Haile suggest, that a constitution must
ignore the ethnic element, is not correct. The non-ethnic element
of western systems simply fails to compare with Ethiopia. With
time, Ethiopia can shift emphasis away from this issue. But, as it
grows economically and develops its infrastructure, and in turn, its
identity as a single unified nation, ethnic groups must be satisfied
with their political participation and know that they are respected
and empowered by their Constitution. Marcus strongly believes
such recognition is necessary for Ethiopia to maintain unity:
More recently, the Oromo and other groups have strongly
asserted their national rights. If Ethiopia is to survive as a
corporate body, its peoples must feel that their cultures and
languages are being safeguarded by the government. Cultural
and political autonomy must be respected as a matter of right.
Otherwise,346
the state will split apart as the minorities compete
for power.
Haile fears the secession of Eritrea as an example of things to
come for the other states.347 Eritrea, however, is unique in that its
secession is partly due to influences whose roots go back over a
hundred years. 348 Besides its separation from Italy 349 as a colony
over a century ago, 350 this difference was compounded by the
Arab world making more substantial efforts to "Arabize" Eritrea,

345. For a recent discussion on the failure of western principles applied to Africa and
Ethiopia, see Dave Peterson, FindingAfrican Solutions to African Problems, THE WASH.
0., June 22, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 12303558.
346. MARCUS, supra note 14, at 219.
347. See HAILE, supra note 40, at 4,32-35,45.
348. Erlich suggests that Eritrea's secession resulted from factors over a century ago:
A series of dramatic events at the end of the nineteenth century in Ethiopia
would shape much of its twentieth-century history. First, Ethiopia collided with
Western imperialism and emerged victorious. The confrontation with the Italians
in Massawa led not only to the loss of Eritrea (establish as an Italian colony in
January1890).

ERLICH, supra note 25, at 65 (emphasis added).
349. For a full discussion on the relationship between Italy and Ethiopia, see
ALBERTO SBACCHI, LEGACY OF BITTERNESS:

1941 (1997).
350. See SPENCER supra note 15.

ETHIOPIA AND FASCIST ITALY, 1935-
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making it culturally distinct from the rest of Ethiopia. 351 Eritrea
possesses the largest concentrations of Arabic speakers.3 52 Eritrea
was also utilized by Italy to police Ethiopia, and it was Menelik II
who made the historic secession of Eritrea. 353
Ethiopia as a whole is already experiencing the strife of the
Eritrea secession. The states understand the result if they secede.
Thus, the circumstances surrounding the secession of Eritrea do
not compare to the potential secession of other Ethiopian states.
Secession is more complicated than a mere bargaining tool which
the states can use whenever a political conflict develops. Perhaps
Haile's analysis of the secession of Eritrea stems from his
unwillingness to note Eritrea's historical context, and his failure to
substantially and legally equate such differentiation to the extent
of its right to secede. Thus, because Haile so strongly believes that
Eritrea belongs united with Ethiopia, this belief results in its right
to secession being no greater than any other Ethiopian state.3 54
While it is not argued here that Eritrea belongs united with
Ethiopia, the point is that it differs historically and culturally
enough that forecasting analogous future secessions by other
Ethiopian states is flawed.
Moreover, there is no alternative to division of the Ethiopian
federal system. Abbink confirms "[t]here is no going back to a
unitary state structure in Ethiopia which denies ethno-regional
differences and rights, or which lets one group dominate the
state." 355 The United States, Canadian and Australian models
may seem to have a blind eye to ethnicity, but Anglo-Saxon
Protestant groups dominate in all of these systems, although other
ethnic influences are changing it as time goes on. Thus, scholars
such as Mattei and Haile have two major flawed suppositions: (1)
you cannot compare the cultures of Ethiopia to the United States,
Canada or Australia and argue that the problem is purely legal;
and (2) arguing that you must have a more unified federal system

351. See ERLICH, supra note 25, at 151 et seq. Chapter 12, "The Arabs, Ethiopia, and
the Arabism of Eritrea."
352. REDDEN, supra note 9, at 18.
353. See MARCUS, supra note 14, at 91-92.
354. Haile's article, explicitly discussing this issue with Eritrea, brings a strong
argument to this proposition. See generally Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The
Case of Eritrea,8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 479 (1994).
355. See Abbink, supra note 40, at 174.
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with little emphasis on ethnic consideration is wrong. To say
otherwise means that one ethnicity must dominate, a fact that is
true of the western systems.
Abbink may have forgotten the United States suppression of
the Native American and African-American populations.
Certainly, if the United States Constitution took into consideration
ethnic groups, slaves would not have been regarded as "chattel,"
nor would slavery have been condoned. 356 The history of what the
United States Constitution has allowed against various ethnic
groups must be considered before one can put forth the
proposition that Ethiopia's Constitution should not consider
ethnicity, and use the United States Constitution as a model. In
Ethiopia, the Amhara has dominated for hundreds of years and
Ethiopia needs time to develop a more integrated dominant
culture before the ethnic considerations can be set on the back
burner. It needs time for the groups to let out steam and cool.
Only then can it grow.
Ethnic groups today are experiencing the seeds of equality
after centuries of disharmony. For example, out of the eighty
ethnic groups in Ethiopia, some, such as the Oromo, who were
subjugated during the nineteenth century, are now experiencing a
greater say over their own affairs. The U.S. State Department
notes this: "With federalism.., citizens of the Oromiya now have
a greater say over their own affairs and resources. Primary school
students are taught in their local languages, consistent with the

356. James MacGregor Burns and Stewart Burns are on example of the primary
discussion on this issue:
Slavery was no where explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and thus was at
the very least condoned. Madison in 1787 had said that it would be 'wrong to
admit in the Constitution that there could be property in men,' but he had also
assured the Virginia ratifying convention that 'no power is given to the general
government to interpose with respect to the property now held by states.' Slaves
appeared in the document only be implication, as the 'such Persons' with whose
importation Congress was barred from interfering before 1808, as the 'other
Persons' valuated at three-fifths of 'free Persons' in the apportionment of
representatives and taxes, and as those 'held to Service or Labour' who, if they
succeeded in fleeing to 'free' states, had to be returned to their owners. Despite
Madison, the American Constitution indeed regarded slaves not as citizens or as
beings endowed with unalienable rights but as articles of commerce, as property.
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLE'S CHARTER, THE PURSUIT
OF RIGHTS IN AMERICA 60 (1991).
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new Constitution.- 357
The federal regions divided along ethnic guidelines have a
great deal of independence and they are increasingly autonomous,
The
particularly regarding fiscal and political issues. 358
has
not
observes,
State
Department
as
the
however,
relationship,
"yet been finalized. ' 359 The Report notes that much of the trouble
with the implementation of federalism has been due, not to the
Constitution and the choice of ethnic federalism, but rather, "a
the civil
history of highly centralized authority, great poverty,
360
culture."
democratic
with
conflict, and unfamiliarity
Some student commentators, such as Derege Demisse,
believe that the world-wide trend in secession is the result of
governments failing to recognize their ethnic groups as they
should, although he believes that the Ethiopian model may go too
far:
Maintaining territorial integrity may no longer remain as the
best means of maintaining world stability. The lessons of recent
developments around the globe resound the calamity that
awaits the world if nations continue to deny their own people
the right to self-determination. Troubled nations currently face
two options: They can either make serious substantive and
structural changes in the way they organize society, or
the old ways and let the trend of secession dictate
perpetuate 361
the future.
The Ethiopian Constitution's grant of secession to ethnic
groups is indeed the result of former Ethiopian governmental
failure to recognize equality among the nation's ethnic groups.
Other commentators have recognized a similar problem today in
international conflict as a "blind spot" in international law.
Jerome Wilson concludes:
The present approach of international law to groups and group
rights is statist, historically outdated, and politically naive. As a
result, it is unable to comprehend, and therefore, to address the

357. 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 11.
358. See id. at 1.
359. Id.
360. Id. For a view with no mention of the problems with implementing democratic
and human rights, see All African News Agency, Ethiopia Admits to Human Rights
Violations, AFR. NEWS SERVICE, June 1, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 11856927.

361. Demissie, supra note 261, at 191.
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phenomenon of ethnic conflict, which is one of the major
threats to human rights in the world today. Only by taking
account of current developments in international politics and
evaluating the need for group rights from a human rights (as
opposed to statist) perspective will international law be able to
role of promoting freedom, justice and
perform its intended
36 2
peace in the world.
Wilson also states that the dangers of ethnic rights to selfdetermination are noted, but ethnic rights should be balanced with
36 3
rights for self-determination on a case-by-case basis.
The view from Professor Bereket Habte Selassie on selfdetermination for ethnic groups is stronger, although he does
await the final outcome with a positive hopeful concern, labeling
Ethiopia's "ethnic-based federal arrangement" as a "bold and
imaginative type of national engineering." 364 Selassie states that in
order for the Ethiopian system to succeed, "mutual trust among
the component parts and strong federal institutions are critical
prerequisites." 3 65 Selassie notes that despite the criticism of many
about ethnic federalism in Ethiopia's Constitution, the secession
mechanism may relieve ethnic tension:
The EPRDF 36 6 view is that, rather than stimulated nationalism
(which has been stimulated enough already), the right to secede
would defuse ethnic discontent. Even opponents admit that the
availability of this constitutional right would so color Ethiopian
politics as to make its exercise less likely and less violent. In
any event, the exercise of the right is governed by intricate
procedures that place many hurdles to be passed, thereby
362. Wilson, supra note 260.
363. See id. at 484.
364. Habte Selassie,-supra note 259.
365. Id.
366. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front was the government in
power who implemented the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution.
In May 1991, the much hated and brutal military-Marxist dictatorship that
traumatized Ethiopians for seventeen years was finally overthrown. The major
military, if not the political, forces responsible for the demise of the dictatorship
(known as the "Derg" in Amharic) were the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF). Upon the fall of the Derg, the EPRDF quickly proceeded to assume
'state responsibility' pending the formation of a transitional government.
Alemante G. Selassie, Ethiopia: Problems and Prospectsfor Democracy, 1 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 205 (1992). See also JOHN H. SPENCER, ETHIOPIA AT BAY: A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT OF THE HAILE SELLASSIE YEARS (1985).
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providing all those concerned the time and motive to reconsider
367
the last resort of secession.
Haile is correct regarding the Constitution creating an "ethnic
federation" as a federal system that develops states from ethnic
guidelines. 36 8 He suggests the Ethiopian states present a problem
because each state has a dominant ethnic group that subverts the
influence of minority groups. Such a system will inevitably
develop parties based on ethnic guidelines.
His assertion,
however, is also incorrect because there is no other system
applicable to Ethiopia. Any other approach will inevitably create
even more problems. Would a system based on a more random or
ethnically-blind guideline, such as the United States be superior?
Some states were developed out of just such a pragmatic division
of land. Most states, however, have their own cultural identity.
The problems inherent in divisions involving ethnic groups
can be seen in Canada where the French-Canadian province of
Montreal is threatening secession. The division of states in the
United States seems less "ethnic" because the population as a
whole was homogenous in race and religion. To develop a system
that divides the Ethiopian State into other divisions will face
obstacles far greater than the current ones. Imagine the conflict
when one state is granted more of its original territory than
another state. Even if all states are rearranged in a mathematically
equal fashion, who determines which method to use? Some states
would certainly be affected more than others. The system of
ethnic dominance will likely prevail because some group will come
to dominate. It is not the legal system in Ethiopia, nor the issue of
ethnicity within the Constitution, that creates problems, but rather
the existence of the great ethnic diversity in Ethiopia and centuries
of ignoring minority ethnic groups.
The fear that "[t]he tribal homelands will have other
extensive and dangerous powers conferred upon them and their
individual capacity by the Constitution," 3 69 is misplaced, for
Ethiopia has always been one single unified nation and will
remain that way. The only relevant worry is that minority groups
within each state will require protection of their rights and

367. Selassie, supra note 259, at 128.
368. See Haile, supra note 40, at 10.
369. Id at 82-83.
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mechanisms for equal representation at the state level, and
whether the Constitution provides for this popular control.
The United States Constitution can be commended for its
ability to be organic and instill the ideals that become increasingly
apparent as American society progresses economically, politically
and culturally. The Ethiopian Constitution seeks to instill rights at
the level of a highly-developed industrial society.
This is
commendable, but the mechanism must also be instilled for the
country to prosper economically.
2. Ethiopia's Continued Economic Failure
Ethiopia has recently shown signs of a growing economy
capable of becoming an agricultural giant.
The economy,
however, is in danger due to an abundance of democratic and
humanitarian failures. 370
The many failures can fairly be
attributed to a system ill prepared to meet the demanding
investment and economic growth of a rapidly developing country.
The root of Ethiopia's many problems can be found not only in the
371
country itself, but in Africa as a whole.
Many factors contribute to Africa's poor capacity for
economic development, such as a high level of corruption and
uncertainty in business and other transaction. 372 Although
Ethiopia is reportedly superior to many African nations in regards
to corruption, 373 it nevertheless displays symptoms. 374 Proper
370. For a full discussion on the Ethiopian Economy, although older discussion
immediately after the Marxist overthrow, see THE ECONOMY OF ETHIOPIA (Keith Griffin
ed., 1992); JAMES PICKETT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA: AGRICULTURE,
THE MARKET AND THE STATE (1991).
371. See Wa Mutuna, supra note 256.
372. This is not to say, however, that the legal structure of many African nations stifles
foreign investment. To the contrary, legislation is pushed to promote it. See, e.g., T.O.
ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 et seq. (1972)
(Chapter 12, "The Law of Foreign Investments in Africa: An Outline" discussing inter alia
Nigeria). But see United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Tips for
Business Travelers to Nigeria (July 1993). "A major development affecting business
travelers to Nigeria is commercial fraud or scams." Id.
373. Some Middle Eastern nations are not immune from corruption and in analyzing
Ethiopia, one must not forget the ties of Ethiopia, not only to Africa, but the Middle East.
See, e.g., ERLICH, supra note 25, at 159.
374. See 1996 State Dep't Report, supra note 273, at 2, reporting that, some of
Ethiopia's actions are helping fight against corruption:
[The Ethiopian Government] sought to strengthen the judiciary; additional civil
and criminal judges were trained and assigned to regional courts, while efforts to
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economic development requires certainty. Investors should not
have to worry whether their money is going in the right hands.
They should not have to worry about how many bribes it will take
to complete a particular transaction or order of business. They
should not have to worry about whether those they are turning
their money over to are really who they claim to be. When the
economists of a country are forced to deal with these concerns, the
economy of that country will be severely hurt by the
stigmatization. Ultimately, everyone in the country will suffer.
True prosperity for Ethiopia can only lie in a system whose
Constitution commands no corruption.
Corruption is evidenced by the abundance of democratic and
human rights failures. Despite the Ethiopian Constitution's
demand of those rights, they have reportedly been violated almost
The
immediately after the Constitution's implementation.
problem can be attributed to the fact that the Constitution focuses
on the nuances of those rights while failing to adequately address
Ethiopia's infrastructure. The best foundation for human rights
and democracy is one made of economic prosperity and a high
standard of living. The moral and political culture of the nation
must set the proper stage for development and growth. This
includes agriculture, industry, intellectual property rights and a
stable political structure. Both political and ethnic stability,
regardless of the potential autonomy the Constitution grants
ethnic minorities, will only surface in an Ethiopian state that
eliminate judicial malfeasance resulted in the dismissal of many others. The
Government sought to enhance transparency and accountability by publishing in
state media several detailed reports of officials who were jailed or dismissed for
abuse of authority, corruption, and violations of human rights. Governmental
transparency, however, remains a problem. In October, the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense was dismissed from all official posts for
corruption.
Id.
The Government is making concerted efforts to identify and train replacements
for many lower court judges. Many judges were hastily appointed in 1991 and
were subsequently dismissed for corruption, incompetence, or abuse of
authority. The Government, aware of the severe lack of trained staff in the
judicial system, began in 1995 to place greater emphasis on training new judges
and prosecutors. Senior government officials charged with judicial oversight
estimate that the creation of a truly independent and skilled judicial apparatus
will take several decades. The Government has welcomed foreign financial and
technical assistance.
Id. at 4-5.
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minimizes corruption and maximizes its structural development.
The improvements to Ethiopia's infrastructure are increasing.
With the new government since 1994, corruption is vanishing in
many areas:
Although the government had to import almost 500,000 tons of
relief grain this year to stave off an emergency (a larger tonnage
by far than anywhere else in the world, the regime works.
With a sophisticated "early warning" system and, crucially, far
more trust between the government and the international
agencies, distribution of relief is efficient and virtually free of
corruption. As a result, UN Officials now believe that
a repeat
375
of the 1973 or 1984 famines is almost inconceivable.
Relief from famine is now crucial for Ethiopia because the
country is heavily based on agriculture; "85 percent of the
population of 58.5 million liv[e] in rural areas under very poor
conditions." 376 "Coffee accounts for about 60 percent of export
377
revenues."
Some observers claim that Ethiopia is among the worst of
African nations in promoting a free market economy, 378 while
other observers have noted that the present Ethiopian
Administration supports "not only elections, but decentralization,
civil service reform and constitutional drafting." 379 Ethiopia has
"continued to implement an internationally supported economic
reform program designed to liberalize the economy, attract foreign
investment, and bring state expenditures into balance with
revenues." 380 The United States has advanced millions of dollars
promoting recent legislative and executive elections in Ethiopia. 381

375. Jonathan Dimbleby, After 25 Years of Famine and Disaster Returned to Find a
Glimmer of Hope at Last, Daily Mail, Dec. 8, 1998,at 6, available in 1998 WL 21418213.
376. 1997 State Dep't Report, supra note 146, at 1.
377. id.
378. See Andrew Selsky, World Press Column, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar. 25,
1998, at 3, availablein 1998 WL 3326776.
379. Susan E. Rice, New Generation of African Leaders, Statement of Susan E. Rice,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, U.S. Senate, CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY BY
FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 12, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL
8993212.
380.

Id.

381. Clinton Will Extend Hand to "New Generation of Africans" Remarks by Susan E.
Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Thursday Luncheon Group, Blacks
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Thus, there are some positive signs that Ethiopia's corruption
is lessening, it is this author's belief that the development of
Ethiopia's economy will be the key factor in determining whether
this progress continues. This opinion is based in part on the
United States State Department finding that it is the lack of
resources that is causing the mandates of the Ethiopian
382
Constitution to remain unfulfilled, not the Constitution itself.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

After exploring the Ethiopian Constitution, the structure of
the Ethiopian government, articles discussing the Constitution,
and reports on the realities within Ethiopia in areas governed by
the Constitution, several conclusions can be reached.
The problems of Ethiopia today are not necessarily based on
weaknesses or structural flaws within its Constitution. While it is
true that some structural flaws exist, such as its method for
Constitutional interpretation, its broad and vague use of semantics
in delineating rights and democracy, it is basically a sound
constitution. Hopefully, the development of case law can help
clarify its vagueness. Constitutional interpretation is more difficult
to predict in the Ethiopian experimental version. Much of the
outcome will rest on how the operation of the various
governmental systems will affect the personality of the system, and
the interpretation mechanism correspondingly.
The method of constitutional interpretation and the Federal
Council are probably the simple result of Ethiopia's monarchal
cultural history; its fingerprint on her "western" style Constitution.
The Ethiopian Constitution may be idealistically and semantically
similar to the United States' Constitution. Individual liberties,
human rights and democracy, however, are not "western." They
are just as "African" as they were "American" in the original
thirteen American colonies under British monarchal rule, and as
"British" as the British were under their weakening monarchal
rule.
It is agreed, even by those such as Mattei, that the
Constitution in Ethiopia has many cultural restraints. But that

in Government, Washington, AFRICAN NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 11, 1998, at 7, available in
1998 WL 6608634.
382. 1996 State Dep't Report, supra note 273, at 1,4,5, 9-11.
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does not and should not prevent it from working. Professor Van
383
Doren states that one can be caught up in "positivist" thought.
That is, caught up in what is "written." An American writing just
after the time of the ratification of the United States Constitution,
however, could make a similar assertion about cultural road
blocks. Women's rights in the United States, despite what the
Constitution states, had cultural strongholds against them; during
almost half of the Constitution's history, women in the United
States could not vote. The United States Constitution also
condoned African slavery.
Over time, the United States economy developed, and its
economy has now become on of the world's strongest. Its citizens
enjoy a high standard of living. The United States can now afford
to care for the disabled. Women have gained more equal status in
the wake of the industrial revolution. Only in the past few
decades, however, has state-sanctioned segregation of AfricanAmericans come to an end. Looking at the United States
Constitution, understanding its meaning requires looking at more
that the written document itself. Potential problems within a
Constitution are dominated by the culture in which it is
implemented. It is not the document that makes the law, but the
people and culture that implement it. The positive law, however,
can change to reflect the peoples' will, as clearly evidenced by the
progress in the United States. Ethiopia may also take a long time
to fully develop its constitutional law.
As written, the United States Constitution has allowed many
unfortunate and tragic things. Although slavery and other
inhumane acts were allowed, the Constitution provided positive
written standards that would eventually become a tool in the
elimination of the ills it was originally intended to abolish. The
Ethiopian Constitution provides the same type of tools. After only
four years, with a struggling economy, Ethiopia is striving to
implement the Constitutional goals, such as judicial independence
and promoting human rights, despite cultural roadblocks and lack
of financial resources.
The theoretical "ethnically blind" Constitution is not what it
seems. The United States Constitution mentions no ethnic group
in its demarcation of states, yet the systematic eradication of one
383. See Van Doren, supra note 39, at 204.
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of the United States' largest ethnic groups, the American Indian,
was allowed. Haile overlooks this critical fact: "The 'classic
federations' which have been historic successes, such as those of
the United States, Australia, and Canada (except for Quebec),
have not been primarily based on ethnicity." 384 Professor Haile is
correct in one thing: those countries are successes.
Their
constitutions were also ethnically blind, at least semantically. The
cultures, however, were not ethnically blind, nor was the effect of
their constitutions in the minds of the eradicated American
Indians and Australian Aborigines. The Ethiopian Constitution is
very young. Ethiopians, in all likelihood, do not want to go
experience today, under an ethnically blind constitution, what the
American Indian and Australian Aborigine went through over a
century ago.
Ethiopia has many more ethnic groups that are a
proportionately larger percentage of the population than the
American Indians.
After hundreds of years of Amharic
dominance they simply want to be autonomous. Their presence is
so pronounced that to divide Ethiopia into a federation by any
other terms would create more problems than it would solve.
Those, such as Haile, who adamantly criticize the Ethiopian
system, offer no alternatives. Ethiopia's "ethnic" federation and
the state right to secede will promote, at least psychologically, a
feeling of ethnic equality. The history and realities in Ethiopia
today should prevent another "Eritrea" from ever being realized.
Eritrea's history and characteristics are unique. The right to
secede and the constitutional road blocks should prevent any
further secession. In light of the interdependence between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, the current war will eventually be resolved,
and hopefully they will enter into a new, more constructive
relationship. 385
384. Haile, supra note 40, at 10.
385. See MARCUS, supra note 14, at 218.
A sovereign Eritrea has to retain economic access to the Ethiopian hinterland,
especially if Asmera builds a light manufacturing economy. Eritrea has always
been a net exporter of people to Ethiopia, from where much of its food has been
imported. This truth manifested itself during Axumite times and has been a fact
throughout history. The economic symbiosis has not necessarily been reflected
in the area's political allegiances. Although the coastal strip was for long periods
not under its sovereignty, Ethiopia always used Mitsiwa and especially Aseb
would wither as commercial centers. There is therefore a clear need for a
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In sum, the Ethiopian Constitution has the makings of a
grand tool that will promote democracy, human rights and
individual liberties, despite some structural flaws. The key to
Ethiopia's success will be its ability to promote economic
development, which will be seen as time progresses. Hopefully, as
the economy develops, so will the other rights so closely linked to
the nation's economic prosperity.
If each tribe in Ethiopia claimed to be a separate nation
within Ethiopia, surely it would result in Ethiopia's demise.
Ethiopia as a nation of tribes would be disheartening.
By
recognizing Ethiopia's constituent parts, this situation can be
averted. A Constitution that ignored Ethiopia's ethnic groups
under the false veil of one culture, presumably the Amharic
culture, before allowing Ethiopia a chance to develop a unique
culture of its own, would blind the Ethiopian people to a strong
ethnic reality and reduce their voice to the meaningless semantics
of the Ethiopian Constitution. As Gibran also said, "Woe to the
nation, whose sage is voiceless, whose champion is blind, whose
advocate is a prattler."

relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea that goes beyond the normal bilateral
relations of neighbors. Over time, the two nations will have to forge a new
political relationship reflecting economic realities.

